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INTRODUCTION

Article V on the judiciary makes few basic changes in the existing
court system. In some respects, this is unfortunate, for many reforms were
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University. Co-ordinator of legal research for the Constitutional Convention of 1973, conducting research for the
Judiciary Committee. Though this article is based in part on the author's experience
in working with CC/73, it is not an official statement or commentary of the
convention or the committee. The opinions and statements are solely those of the
author.
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desirable, including a truly integrated court system. However, radical
change was not politically possible. The article that emerged from the
constitutional convention is nonetheless an improvement over the former
constitution, primarily because it omits much of the detailed material of
the former document and gives the legislature flexibility to change the
system in a number of desirable ways.
This commentary is a selective catalogue of the important features of
the judiciary article, accompanied by a discussion of some problems that
may arise under the new provisions.
COURT STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION

The constitution itself establishes the structure and organization of the
court system and does not follow the federal pattern or the Model State
Constitution ideal which allow the legislative authority great flexibility in
organizing and changing the system. The approach taken by the Committee on the Judiciary and accepted by the convention is similar to that of the
1921 Louisiana Constitution and results in the legislature being prevented
from making significant change in the main elements of the system.
At the outset, the committee had a choice between two documents
that would serve as its basic working draft. "Draft A" contained 47
sections that were basically a condensation of existing constitutional provisions' while "Draft B" contained 18 sections based on model constitutional provisions that provided for less rigidity in court structure.2 With
little hesitation, the committee chose to work from "Draft A," exhibiting
a preference for the traditional approach of the prior constitution and the
protection from legislative change it afforded. 3 Of course, as the work of
the committee and the convention evolved, many changes were made and
flexibility was added, particularly with respect to the lower courts. But in
its main elements, the structure of the court system is constitutionally
established and not subject to legislative change.
1. Judiciary Committee Staff Memo. No. 15.
2.

Id. No. 13.

3. Preliminary votes in committee began with the meeting of April 14, 1973,
and continued in successive meetings using "Draft A" as the working document.
See JUDICIARY COMMITTEE MINUTES, Mar. 3, Apr. 14 and Apr. 21, 1973 [hereinafter
cited as MINUTES]. Earlier, both Drafts A and B had been mailed to committee
members. The strong reaction of a number of judges, particularly some in Orleans
Parish, against Draft B necessitated an explanatory letter dated April 13, 1973, to a
number of those judges explaining that "this draft represented the policy choices
and recommendations of no one. It was a preliminary exercise to demonstrate one
approach to a short, concise constitution along the lines of the national model
judicial articles."
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Article V, Section 1 is the basic limiting provision: "The judicial
power is vested in a supreme court, courts of appeal, district courts, and
other courts authorized by this Article." The section itself vests judicial
power in the three named courts, thus preventing the legislature from
divesting those courts of that power. The section also limits the legislature's authority in that judicial power can be vested in no other courts than
those "authorized by this Article." 4 Since the only type of new court
"authorized" is the parish court, 5 the legislative power to establish new
types of courts is severely curtailed.
The policy of curbing the legislative power over court structure and
organization was reinforced in the Local Government Article through the
adoption of a provision to ensure that local governments would have no
power to establish or change courts. Article VI, Section 25 provides,
"Notwithstanding any provision of this Article, courts and their officers
may be established or affected only as provided in Article V of this
constitution. "6
The Supreme Court
The constitution continues the existence of the one supreme court of
the state composed of seven judges, "a chief justice and six associate
4. The limiting effect of Section 1 can be seen in STATE OF LOUISIANA
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973 VERBATIM TRANSCRIPrs Aug. 15, 1973 at 10
[hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS]. The minutes of the Judiciary Committee of
April 20, 1973, at page three, disclose that the chairman put to the committee the
question of whether the legislature should be able to establish additional courts. The
committee voted to name the top three levels of courts in the constitution and then
to refer to "such other courts as the constitution may authorize," instead of using
an "as provided by law" formula that would have allowed the legislature to
establish other courts. This result represents no essential change from the first
paragraph of La. Const. art. VII, § 1 (1921). See comments to Committee Proposal

6, § 1, in

OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973 OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA, July 6, 1973 at 15 [hereinafter cited

as JOURNAL]; Comments to Draft A, § 1. See also LA. ST. L. INST., 2 PROJET OF A
CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 553 (1954) [hereinafter cited as
PROJET]. Section 1 was passed as drafted by the committee with no amendments
submitted. JOURNAL, Aug. 15, 1973 at 23. On final styling, the "shall be vested"
phrase was changed to "is vested" to conform with Rule 11 of the Manual of Style
and Drafting which required use of the present tense. The phrase "authorized by
this constitution" was also changed to "authorized by this Article" "because
nowhere else in this constitution are courts authorized to be created except by this
Article." PROCEEDINGS, Jan. 9, 1974 at 68.
5. LA. CONST. art. V, § 15.
6. The section was not part of the Local and Parochial Government Committee Proposal but was added by floor amendment proposed by three members of the
Judiciary Committee. JOURNAL, Sept. 26, 1973 at 3. The amendment was adopted
by an overwhelming 96-16 vote.
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justices." 7 Though the constitution does not require full court participation
to decide a case, that is the likely effect since it does require that four
judges "must concur to render judgment.''8 The corresponding requirement of the prior constitution was that four judges must "concur to render
judgment when the court is sitting en banc," 9 and it was further provided
that the court could sit in divisions composed of three judges.'° The new
document imposes the four-judge-for-judgment requirement in all instances and suppresses the prior authorization to sit in divisions. While this
change does not prohibit the court from sitting in divisions since what is
not prohibited is allowed, the four-judge requirement makes a procedure
of sitting in divisions impractical.
Though an early committee working draft would have permitted the
court to sit in divisions," that authorization was not carried forward in the
committee's proposals to the convention. This action was not desirable,
for "the authority to sit in divisions should be retained to assure a means of
extending the court's manpower to dispose of routine appeals of right in

the event of continuing increase. This procedure was only utilized once,
during 1921-23, but the reserved power should be retained in the event of

future need."1 2 Ending the authority to sit in panels was not the subject of
much debate in the committee, and was approved with only two dissenting
votes. 3 This result probably is explained by the general acceptance of the
current practice of the court sitting only as a full body; a desire to present a
drastically shortened article on the judiciary; and because more important,
hard-fought policy matters were then occupying the committee. No attempt was made on the convention floor to add an authorization to sit in
divisions.
Section 4 requires that the state be "divided into at least six supreme
court districts, and at least one judge shall be elected from each." This
provision allows the legislature to provide for single member supreme

court districts. However, until such action, the existing six districts are
maintained, five districts electing one judge each, and the First District,
7. LA. CONST. art. V, § 3. The constitution makes no technical distinction
between the terms "justice" and "judge." While Section 3, in the first sentence,
does use the term "justice," the second sentence of the section, as well as subse-

quent sections, refers to a member of the supreme court as a "judge." See, e.g.,
LA. CONST. art- V, 99 2, 4, 6, 22-24.
8. Id. art. V, § 3.
9. La. Const. art. VII, § 4 (1921).
10. Id. §§ 5, 6.
11. Draft A, § 4.
12. Id. § 4, Comments.
13. MINUTES, Apr. 20, 1973 at 3, 4.
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composed of Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard and Jefferson Parishes,
electing two members to the court.' 4 The constitution itself does not
enumerate the geographic area of each district as did the prior constitution,' 5 but any change in the composition of the existing districts requires a
law enacted by 2/3 vote of the elected membership of each house of the
legislature.' 6 The convention did not reapportion the districts according to
7
population, nor did it require the legislature to do so.'
An attempt was made on the convention floor, particularly by delegates from Jefferson Parish, to require seven single-member districts.'"
Though much of the early debate on the proposition focused on the
one-man, one-vote ideal and on single-member district principles, the
proposition quickly became a political one since the seat of one first
district justice who was a resident of Orleans Parish was soon to be up for
reelection. The prospect of gerrymandering one justice out of office by
carving up his district was raised.' 9 The convention, wary of becoming
involved in the intricacies of Orleans and Jefferson Parish politics and
aware of the 4-3 division of the court on many important issues, defeated
the amendment by a 27-85 vote.2" Subsequent attempts to require a
redivision of the districts after that upcoming election were also defeated. 2 ' The result is that the reapportionment of the districts and the
possibility of dividing the first district is left to the legislature subject to the
2/3 vote requirement of Section 4 and the provisions of Section 21 that
forbid shortening the term of a sitting judge.
Under the Judiciary Committee proposal, a provision like that of the
prior constitution 22 establishing staggered terms for supreme court judges
14. La. Const. art. VII, § 9 (1921).
15. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 16(5) continued as a statute Art. VII, Sec. 9 of the
1921 Constitution which enumerated the districts. This provision has been placed in
the Statutes as LA. R.S. 13:101 by La. Acts 1975, No. 51.
16. LA. CONST. art. V, § 4.
17. The one-man-one-vote rule does not apply to election districts for supreme
court justices. Wells v. Edwards, 347 F. Supp. 453 (M.D. La. 1972), aff'd, 409 U.S.
1095 (1973).
18. An attempt made in committee to require seven districts failed by a vote of
7-8. MINUTES, Apr. 20, 1973 at 4. Later Delegate Proposal 35 to require seven
districts was tabled in the committee. Id., Dec. 14, 1973 at 2.
19. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 15, 1973 at 31-50. See especially id. at 40, where one
Orleans Parish delegate stated, "Gerrymandering will occur and a justice who is
serving at this time, regardless of who he may be if this is passed, he (sic) will be
gerrymandered out of office in some way, manner, shape or form."
20. Id. at 42.
21. Id. at 47, 49, 50.
22. La. Const. art. VII, § 7 (1921) was continued as a statute by art. XIV, §
16(5), but was subsequently repealed by La. Acts 1975, No. 171.
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was unnecessary since staggering would occur automatically as existing
terms expired.2 3 Under that proposal, with its 14-year terms for supreme
court judges, one seat on the court would continue to be up for election
every two years. However, since the convention reduced the judges' terms
to ten years 24 and made no other provision relative to staggering, the
practice of having one judge elected every second year will no longer
exist. In 1986 and again in 1988, two seats on the court will be up for
election. In each subsequent ten-year cycle, the third and fourth district
elections will coincide, and two years later, the fifth district and one of the
first district elections will coincide. In the other three elections in the
cycle, the other first district seat, the sixth district seat and the second
district seat will be the only ones to be filled. The reduction in terms thus
results in the undesirable possibility of having a changeover of a majority
of the court within a period of little more than two years, a prospect which
does not enhance the stability of the top court of the state.
The provisions of the 1921 Constitution allowing temporary assignment of lower court judges to the supreme court in case of illness or
vacancy 25 were unnecessarily detailed and were omitted in the new document; however, the substance of the prior law is retained and expanded
since Section 5(A) allows the supreme court to "assign a sitting or retired
judge to any court." Additionally, in case of a vacancy, Section 22 allows
the supreme court to appoint "a person meeting the qualifications for the
office, other than domicile, to fill the vacancy" pending the calling of a
special election. Under this provision, the court can appoint any attorney
26
with five years experience, and not necessarily a judge.
Courts of Appeal
The Judiciary Article establishes the structure of the courts of appeal,
making little change in them and continuing them as courts devoted
primarily to civil matters. 21 It does, however, provide more flexibility to
alter minor aspects of their organization.
23. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 15, 1973 at 12.
24. LA. CONST. art. V, § 3. See the text accompanying note 241, infra.
25. La. Const. art. VII, § 4 (1921).
26. See the text accompanying note 221, infra.
27. Though Article V, Section 10 vests no criminal appellate jurisdiction in the
courts of appeal, Section 5(E) allows the legislature to grant them jurisdiction in
those misdemeanor cases in which appeal does not lie to the supreme court. See the
text accompanying note 171, infra.

1977]

THE JUDICIAL ARTICLE

Section 1 vests judicial power in "courts of appeal." Had the constitution stopped at that point, the legislature would have been free to
organize the intermediate appellate courts as it chose, providing for example, for separate civil and criminal appeals courts. 28 However, it went
further and specified their basic structure in Sections 8-13. These provisions limit the legislature, because any court of appeal which is established
must comply with Sections 8-13. Since Section 8 permits only one court of
appeal in each circuit and Section 10 provides that "a court of appeal has
appellate jurisdiction of all (1) civil cases decided within its circuit and (2)
matters appealed from family and juvenile courts .

.

.

,"

it would not be

permissible for the legislature to establish intermediate appellate courts
limited to criminal cases. While it is true that Section 1 also vests judicial
power in "other courts authorized by this Article," no courts of appeal
other than those specified in Sections 8-13 are authorized.
The Judiciary Committee considered the possibility of providing
some intermediate appellate review of criminal matters instead of continuing the prior system of having most criminal appeals heard by the supreme
court. 29 But it was not able to agree on a formula to change the existing
system, and the matter did not reach the convention floor.
Section 8 requires that the state "be divided into at least four circuits,
with one court of appeal in each," thereby preventing the establishment of
one state-wide court of appeal or otherwise reducing the number of
appellate courts from the existing four, but allowing the legislature to
establish additional circuits and courts of appeal as the caseload requires.
The prior constitutional enumeration of the geographic jurisdiction of each
28. Draft B would have taken this approach, but the committee worked from
Draft A which contained Sections 11-18 devoted to organization of the courts of
appeal.

29. See Baton Rouge State Times, Mar. 9, 1973 at I-B, col. 1. Court of Appeal
Judge Minos D. Miller testified before the committee advising it to keep the current
structure and urging that if criminal appeals became too burdensome for the
supreme court, change could be handled through constitutional amendment. He

said that if the constitution were to change the system, he would recommend special
panels composed of five court of appeal judges serving on a rotating basis to hear
criminal appeals, rather than adopting a separate criminal appellate court or enlarging the jurisdiction of existing appellate courts to encompass criminal matters.
See also Draft A, Section 6(E) which would have allowed the legislature to
transfer criminal appellate jurisdiction from the supreme court to courts of appeal.
This provision was not adopted by the committee.
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court of appeal
is omitted," ° but the existing division of the state into four
"circuits" 31 is continued by Section 9. That section allows the legislature
to change the extent of the circuits, but such changes must be "by law
enacted by two-thirds of the elected members of each house of the
legislature."
The quoted word formula indicates the necessity of approval of
two-thirds of the entire membership of each house, rather than simply
two-thirds of the members voting. This two-thirds requirement, and the
many other supermajority requirements in the constitution, may seem
inadvisable and puzzling. In many respects they are, and a fully articulated
rationale to support them is not readily discernible from convention records. They are explainable partly as compromises by opposing forces in
instances in which one group favored keeping a constitutional requirement
intact and another group favored complete legislative freedom in the area.
Another reason for these limitations can be attributed to a general distrust
of the legislature and, with respect to the judiciary, fear of legislative
action that would harm the judicial system. The oftmentioned gerrymandering of Judge Pavy by Huey Long32 was a continual point of argument to
support the need to curb the legislature. While such requirements for
supermajority votes may prevent some ill-advised legislation, they will
also be an impediment to legislative improvement of the judicial system.
In any event, one can at least be content with the fact that fewer matters
will require constitutional amendment for change and, overall, more
flexibility is granted to the legislature than the prior constitution provided.
Sections 8 and 9 require that at least three judges be attached to each
court of appeal; 33 however, the practical minimum is five judges, since
Section 8(B) requires reargument of some cases "before a panel of at least
five judges." While it would be permissible to attach only three judges to
each court with judges from other courts being assigned temporarily for
30.

La. Const. art. VII, § 20 (1921) (as amended by La. Acts 1968, No. 696,

continued as a statute by art. XIV, § 16(5) and then incorporated as LA. R.S. 13:312
by La. Acts 1975, No. 52).
31.

Though the origin of the term "circuit courts" can be traced to circuit

riding by judges to hold sessions of court in various locations, the term "circuit" as
used in Section 8 refers to a geographic area, "the areas bounded" by limits,
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 408 (1969).

32.

See T. WILLIAMS, HUEY LONG 861 (Knopf ed. 1969).

33. LA. CONST. art. V, § 8 also requires panels "of at least three judges."
Section 9 requires each circuit to be divided into "at least three districts, and at least
one judge shall be elected from each."
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rearguments, 34 such a procedure would be cumbersome absent a drastic
change in the number and organization of the courts of appeal.
An improvement over the prior constitution does result from the
omission of provisions which fixed in the constitution the specific number
of judges serving on each court of appeal; 35 Section 9 does not itself fix
that number, but rather continues the existing number, subject to change
by law enacted by two-thirds vote of the elected membership of each
house.
The appellate courts must sit in "panels composed of at least three
judges selected according to rules adopted by the court." This requirement
of Section 8 allows panels of more than three, as may be provided by law
or by rule, thus authorizing en banc hearings in some instances or even
allowing the appellate courts to hear all cases before the entire membership of the court. 36 It is not required that the panels be "rotating" as the
prior document required, 37 but it is of course allowed. In these matters, the
constitution reduces the binding constitutional detail and provides more
flexibility for the courts of appeal to divide their caseload in the most
efficient manner. Beyond the basic requirement that cases before those
courts be heard by at least three judges there is great flexibility. Of course,
court of appeal rules in these matters are subject to the general supervisory
power of the supreme court over all other courts and to the supreme court's
power to make procedural and administrative rules for the entire court
system. 38 This power is necessary to ensure that degree of uniformity of
court of appeal operation that is considered desirable by the supreme
court.
Under prior law, court of appeal circuits were divided into electoral
districts, and judges were elected from those districts. But, upon establishment of new judgeships which did not mesh into the existing district
34. Id. art. V, § 5A provides that the supreme court "may assign a sitting or
retired judge to any court."
35.

See La. Const. art. VII, § 21(1921) (as amended by La. Acts 1958, No. 561;

La. Acts 1968, No. 696; La. Acts 1968, No. 676; continued as a statute by art. XIV,
§ 16(5) and then incorporated as LA. R.S. 13:312.1, 312.2 by La. Acts 1975, No.
115).

36. En banc proceedings were clearly contemplated, as shown in PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 13, 1973 at 57. See also LA. CONST. art. V, § 8(B) (reference to hearings
before at least five judges).
37. La. Const. art. VII, § 23 (1921) (as amended by La. Acts 1958, No. 561).
38. LA. CONST. art. V, § 5(A). See the text accompanying note 93, infra.
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structure, at-large judgeships with the whole circuit as their constituency
came into existence. 39 Section 9 allows continuation of these at-large
judgeships, for it simply requires each circuit to be "divided into at least
three districts, and at least one judge shall be elected from each." Once
that minimum requirement is met, additional judgeships need not be
elected from a district. The Judiciary Committee proposed Section 9
virtually as it was finally adopted. 4° When the convention considered the
section, however, a number of delegates objected to the burdens of judges
running at-large in the circuits, and an amendment by Delegate Ruth L.
Miller was adopted to prevent a judge from being elected at-large from a
circuit. 41 Later in the convention, however, a conflicting delegate proposal
by Delegate R. Harmon Drew was adopted. 42 In the face of these conflicting provisions the convention, toward the end of its proceedings, adopted
the Drew formulation and the final document does not contain the prohibition against at-large judgeships.43
The constitution does provide flexibility in establishing new judgeships: the legislature can provide for redivision of the circuit and establish
new districts; it can provide for more judges to be elected within existing
districts; or it can establish more at-large judgeships. But, here again, the
districts and "the judges as elected" from districts or at-large on the
effective date of the constitution are continued, subject to legislative
44
change enacted by two-thirds vote of each house.
The new document deletes much of the detail of the prior constitution; it does not state the domicile of the appellate courts, does not require
them to sit at a designated domicile, and does not provide the length of the
39. See La. Const. art. VII, §21(1921) (as amended by La. Acts 1958, No. 561;
La. Acts 1968, No. 696; La. Acts 1968, No. 676).
40. Committee Proposal 21, § 9, in JOURNAL, Aug. 16, 1973 at 5; Committee
Proposal 6, § 9, in JOURNAL, July 6, 1973 at 15.
41. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 16, 1973 at 77.
42. Delegate Proposal 32; JOURNAL, Nov. 20, 1973, at 5, 6.
43. PROCEEDINGS, Jan. 9, 1974 at 85-89. Delegate Miller stated: "I would like
for it to be remembered that Mrs. Miller withdrew her objection on the sincere,
bottom of the heart, deep-hearted promise of Representative Drew that this matter
would be taken up in the Judiciary Committee of the Legislature and something be
done about it." Id. at 85.
44. The legislature established divisions within the districts of the First Circuit
Court of Appeal for election purposes. LA. R.S. 13:320, adopted by La. Acts 1975,
No. 305.
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sessions of those courts. 45 Such matters are left to legislation and rules of
court.
District Courts
The existing system of district courts is changed little; each district
continues to have one primary court of original jurisdiction to handle all
civil and criminal matters. Section 1 vests judicial power in the "district
courts" and Sections 14-18 establish their structure and jurisdiction, with
the result that, as with the supreme court and the courts of appeal, they are
not subject to major alteration by the legislature.
The whole geographic area of the state must "be divided into judicial
districts, each composed of at least one parish and served by at least one
district judge.' ,4 Though the convention was able to effect some brevity
4
by omitting the detailed statement of the geographic area of each district ,
it continued the existing geographic division of the state into judicial
districts.4 8 Though the constitution allows changes in the districts to be
made by the legislature, it retrogressed by making those changes more
difficult. Under the 1921 Constitution, changes could be made by majority
vote of the legislature;49 under Section 15(B), the legislature may not
"establish, divide, or merge judicial districts" without approval also "in a
referendum in each district and parish affected.' '50
Though this requirement inhibits statewide administration to meet
changes in caseloads in the districts and subordinates general state interest
to local interests, it reflects the convention's strong tendency to limit
legislative control over "local" affairs, a tendency which permeated the
local government provisions of the constitution and which also found
expression in this part of the judiciary article. Though the requirements for
45. La. Const. art. VII, §§ 21-24 (1921). See LA. R.S. 13:312.1 (Supp. 1975);
312.2 (Supp. 1975); 353 (Supp. 1976).
46.

LA. CONST. art. V, § 14.

47. La. Const. art. VII, § 31 (1921) (continued as a statute by art. XIV, § 16(5);
incorporated as LA. R.S. 13:477 by La. Acts 1975, No. 728; and amended by La.
Acts 1976, No. 47).
48.

LA. CONST. art. V, § 15(B).

49. La. Const. art. VII, § 34 (1921).
50. Section 2 of La. Acts 1975, No. 13 proposed dividing the 25th Judicial
District composed of Plaquemines and St. Bernard Parishes and called for an
election in the district and parishes concerned.
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change are stringent, they are clear. 5 If a district is to be divided, approval
by a majority of the voters in the district, as well as by a majority of the
voters in each parish, must be obtained in addition to legislative approval.
If a district is to be abolished and the parishes in it allocated to other
districts, approval must be obtained in the district in question and in the
districts that would gain territory, in addition to approval of the voters in
each parish in each of those districts, all after having obtained legislative
approval. This heavy burden will no doubt impede substantial consolidation of judicial districts. Section 14's requirement that a judicial district be
composed of at least one parish is an attempt to require some diversity
within a district court and to minimize a judge's political dependence on a
very small group of voters.
By its silence on the subject, the constitution allows the legislature
discretion to regulate the system of electing district judges. It is free to
continue the present system of having those judges compete in divisions
with the winner in each division being elected, 52 or to change the process
so that all candidates would run against each other with the top ranking
candidates being elected.5 3 A change in judicial districts, by the provisions
of Section 21, cannot operate to decrease a judge's term; however, his
territorial jurisdiction is not so protected.
The number of judges attached to each district court is not specified
in the constitution, 54 though here again, the document continues the
existing number of judges in each district, subject to change by law
enacted by two-thirds vote of the elected membership of each house of the
51. Committee Proposal 21, § 15(B), would have required approval in a referendum in "each district or parish affected." By floor amendment sponsored by
Delegate Chalin Perez, chairman of the Committee on Local Government, this was
changed to "each district and parish affected" to make the meaning of the requirement unmistakable. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 17, 1973 at 52-54.
52. LA. R.S. 13:582 (1950).
53. No amendments were introduced to require election of judges from singlemember districts within judicial districts, although one delegate did express the
view that such would be desirable: "I feel that this would help the people to be
better represented by their judges. It would make it a lot less expensive for a person
to run for office." Also, "As an example in the Parish of Orleans a person running
for the criminal district court judgeship must spend almost sixty thousand dollars in
order to be elected." PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 16, 1973 at 107.
54. Cf. La. Const. Art. VII, §§ 31.1, 31.2 (1921) (continued as statutes by art.
XIV, § 16(5) and then repealed by La. Acts 1975, Nos. 138 and 506). But see LA.
R.S. 13:621.22 (1976).
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legislature. 55 The committee had proposed allowing such changes by
majority vote but the convention adopted with little debate a floor amend56
ment that restored the two-thirds requirement of the prior constitution.

As the foregoing has disclosed, the constitution continues the district
court structure and does not adopt an integrated court system. Much
discussion about an integrated court system was afield in the state as the
Judiciary Committee began its deliberations. Institute of Judicial Adminis-

tration studies had recommended bringing the courts of limited jurisdiction7
into the district court structure, thus establishing one level of trial courts.1
Representatives of the Institute of Court Management and the American
Judicature Society, as well as prominent Louisiana attorneys, argued for
the proposal in committee. 58 But the committee was not disposed to
change the judicial organization so drastically.
Particularly since a unified court system would have required drastic
changes in the courts of Orleans Parish and since the interests of the
Orleans incumbents were well represented, the committee was unable to
amass the vote needed to propose a truly integrated court system. But, as
is discussed in detail later, the document does allow the legislature to
move in that direction by facilitating abolition of courts of limited jurisdiction. 59 Also, the constitutional provisions regulating the district courts are

such that nothing prevents the legislature, the supreme court, or the district
55. LA. CONST. art. V, § 15(D).
56. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 17, 1973 at 63. See La. Const. art. VII, § 34 (1921).
57. The Institute of Judicial Administration, A Study of the Louisiana Court
System 239 (March, 1972).
58. Witnesses before the Judiciary Committee included Cecil Morgan, former
dean of the Tulane Law School, and George W. Pugh, professor at the LSU Law
School (MINUTES, Mar. 2, 1973 at 2, 3); Harvey Soloman, director of studies for the
Institute of Court Management, Ben R. Miller, Baton Rouge attorney, and Allan
Ashman, director of research, American Judicature Society (id., Mar. 30, 1973 at
2); and Glenn R. Winters, executive director of the American Judicature Society
(id., Apr. 13, 1973 at 2). See Baton Rouge State Times, March 31, 1973, at 11-A,
col. 4; March 30, 1973, at I-B, col. 6; March 23, 1973, at I-B, col. 2. The committee

also heard from the mayor of Port Barre, Louisiana, who had no opposition to
abolishing mayor's courts if the town would still be able to keep the money
collected as fines for violating city ordinances. Id., May 14, 1973, at 5-A, col. 1.
59. Judiciary Committee chairman James Dennis told the convention, "The

basic idea here is to retain the present structure of the trial courts of original
jurisdiction in the State of Louisiana, and to provide for a mechanism for the
legislature to be able to change and reorganize the courts below the district level as
time demands." He added that the legislature could move to a three or four-tiered

court system "that would be uniform and consistent throughout the state and would
not be fragmented and specialized as it is today." PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 17, 1973 at 2.
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courts themselves from establishing specialized divisions within the district courts. Such divisions, with different procedures for juvenile matters,
small claims, traffic cases, etc., are permissible. These would not be
permanent separate courts with separate staffs, but parts of the one court
with centralized staff and administrative control and one corps of judges
who could move from division to division as needs arose and changed. In
addition, the constitution nowhere requires a district court to sit in only
one place, and branches of the district court throughout a district are
permitted. Though the ideal of having one district court for the whole state
with divisions sitting throughout the state is not possible, judges can be
assigned throughout the state by the supreme court. 6°
The lack of regulation by the constitution in these regards allows
something akin to an integrated system on the district court level to be
effectuated as needs for greater efficiency, for specialization, or for
making the courts more accessible are recognized. The increased rulemaking power of the supreme court allows many of these innovations to be
brought about without the necessity for legislative action. Allowing such
flexibility may well be one of the most important contributions the constitution makes toward improvement of the judicial system. It remains for
the legislature and the supreme court to act to take advantage of this
flexibility.
Orleans District Courts
The preferred pattern of organization for district courts, as Section 16
indicates and as most experts who appeared before the committee urged, is
to establish one court in a district with original jurisdiction over all civil
and criminal matters. However, the convention did not impose that pattern
in Orleans Parish and did not require immediate merger of its separate civil
and criminal district courts. 6l A floor amendment to require merger failed
by a vote of 46-68,62 and Section 32 does continue in existence the
separate Orleans civil and criminal district courts.
Organization of the Orleans courts was the single issue that occupied
the most time in the Judiciary Committee and that provoked the most
controversy. At the instance of the Orleans interests, the committee did
not urge merger, and in fact proposed making merger quite difficult by
requiring approval of the legislature and by a referendum in Orleans Parish
60. LA. CONST. art. V, § 5(A).

61. La. Const. art. VII, §§ 80-85 (1921).
62. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 17, 1973 at 29-37.
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to do so. 63 The convention would not give such strong protection to the
status quo, non-uniform organization. It rejected the committee proposal,
first in favor of requiring a two-thirds vote to change the existing Orleans
courts, then finally in favor of permitting change simply by law, meaning
the normal legislative majority vote.'
The convention's action reflected dissatisfaction with the nonuniform structure of Orleans courts.65 That dissatisfaction was also reflected in the reduction of Orleans district judges' terms from twelve to six
years, thus giving them the same terms as the district judges serving the
rest of the state. 6' Though the dissatisfaction was not strong enough to
merge the courts immediately, it did result in a reasonably easy mechanism for the legislature to do so, and in a rejection of the committee's
proposed continuation in the constitution of a special Orleans judicial
67
expense fund managed by the civil district judges.
Other than Section 32, the constitution does not contain provisions
unique to the Orleans district courts. This approach is quite different from
the 1921 constitution which contained several sections devoted to establishing detailed rules for the Orleans courts, rules that were often different
from those applicable to the remainder of the state.68 Since the new
constitution does not contain these separate provisions for the Orleans

district courts, it follows that they are subject to the general provisions of
Sections 14-17 governing all district courts, except as Section 32 might
63. Committee Proposal 21, § 35, in JOURNAL, Aug. 24, 1973 at 7; Committee
Proposal 6, § 37, in JOURNAL, July 6, 1973 at 17.
64. The vote on the question occurred toward the end of the consideration of
the judiciary article. By then the convention had reduced the terms of the Orleans
district judges to six years and had refused to except Orleans from provisions
dealing with abolishing or merging courts of limited jurisdiction. It was obvious that
the convention would not accept the proposal which froze the variances in Orleans
court structure so solidly. Some Orleans delegates conceded the inevitable and
themselves introduced the amendment deleting the referendum requirement and
substituting a two-thirds vote of the legislature. That amendment was approved.
PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 23, 1973 at 80-94. Immediately after that vote, the amendment
allowing change simply by law was adopted by an even larger margin. Id. at 94-97.
65. The sponsor of the amendment to merge the courts said his proposal was

one "that will correct a rotten situation in the city of New Orleans." Also, "I have
been pressured beyond belief by the judges of Orleans Parish, the civil district

judges, to keep the present diversity of courts in the city." Id., Aug. 17, 1973 at 29.
In a poll of attorneys, it was the Orleans Parish bar that was most strongly in favor
of merit selection of judges. See note 208, infra.
66. See the text accompanying note 248, infra.
67. La. Const. art. VII, § 95 (1921); Committee Proposal21, § 35, in JOURNAL,

Aug. 24, 1973 at 7;
68.

PROCEEDINGS,

Aug. 24, 1973 at 94-97.

La. Const. art. VII, 88 75-78 (1921).
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require otherwise. 69 The question then becomes the scope of Section 32
and the extent to which it does require otherwise.
Section 32 provides that "the civil and criminal district courts...
are continued, subject to change by law." It is the courts as courts, the
existence of separate courts that is continued; the section does not continue
all the details of the organization of those courts.7" Correspondingly, the
grant of power to the legislature "to change by law" relates to change in
the continuation of the existence of the separate courts, and not a general
legislative power to change all aspects of the Orleans district courts.
For example, since Section 32 does not address itself to judicial
districts, and since Section 14 requires division of the entire state into
judicial districts, it follows that in this division, Orleans is considered a
judicial district. In the prior constitution, Orleans was not so considered in
the enumeration of judicial districts, 71 and was covered in a separate
section,72 but the new constitution contains no such separate section. That
Orleans is considered a judicial district is further confirmed by the requirement of Section 26 that there be a district attorney for "each judicial
district." Were Orleans not included in this provision, no provision would
exist for a district attorney covering Orleans Parish. 73 The consequence of
69. While Article XIV, Section 16(5) does continue as statutory material much
of the old constitutional material relative to the Orleans courts (art. VII, §§ 80-83,
85, 89-92, and 94-97), that continuation is "except as any of them conflicts with this
constitution." Thus, any provision of the old document continued as statute that is
inconsistent with the provisions of Article V will be given no effect. While the
technique of Section 16 may be criticized for being something less than precise, and
while it would have been better to examine the continued provisions of the old
document in detail to eliminate any conflicts, the technique was forced by time
pressures at the conclusion of the convention and an overcautious approach to
prevent any unforeseen gaps that might result from the elimination of material from
the old constitution.
70. Article V, Section 15(A) uses similar language to similar effect. It "retained" the "district, family, juvenile, parish, city, and magistrate courts existing
on the effective date of this constitution." That provision could not refer to judicial
districts, for Section 15(B) was adopted to handle that matter. It could not refer to
jurisdiction, for Section 16 handles that subject matter and in fact changed the
jurisdiction from what it was under the prior law.
71. La. Const. art. VII, § 31 (1921) provided for "thirty-two judicial districts in
the state, the parish of Orleans excepted .... "
72. La. Const. art. VII, §§ 80 and 82 (1921) established separate criminal and
civil district courts and provided their territorial jurisdiction.
73. Article V, Section 32 makes no reference to the Orleans Parish District
Attorney. The comments to Committee Proposal 6, § 37, the corresponding provision from the committee proposal explained, "The Orleans Parish district attorney
is excluded from treatment under this section, and thus would be subject to the
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considering Orleans a judicial district within the ambit of Sections 14 and
15 is that changes in that district must comply with Section 15(B) requirements of legislative approval and approval by referendum in the district
and parishes affected. The "subject to change by law" language of
Section 32 would not govern such a change in the geographic area of the
district, for this is not a matter that is "continued" by Section 32 and does
not come within the coverage of that section.
Another example results from the fact that Section 32 does not
address the jurisdiction of the Orleans district courts. Section 16 must then
apply to establish their original jurisdiction over "all civil and criminal
matters." 7 4 But, since Section 32 must govern to the extent contrary, and
since Section 32 does require a separate civil and criminal court, it follows
that the civil jurisdiction established in Section 16 is to be apportioned to
the civil court and the criminal jurisdiction to the criminal court. And, in
terms of legislative power to change by law, Section 32 allows change in
the existence vel non of the courts; but it does not address itself to their
jurisdiction generally and does not empower the legislature to change the
jurisdiction other than to reunite the civil and criminal jurisdiction in one
court.
In this way, Section 32, can be seen as a specific exception to a
uniform district court structure to preserve separate criminal and civil
district courts in Orleans as separate courts; in other matters, the Orleans
district courts are to be organized and treated uniformly with the other
district courts of the state. To conclude otherwise would be inconsistent
with the general purpose of the convention of establishing as much
uniformity as possible within the court structure throughout the state; the
policy of preventing substantial legislative change of the constitutional
structure; and the policy of requiring supermajority votes to effectuate
most of those changes in district court structure that are allowed.
Courts of Limited and Specialized Jurisdiction
As discussed, the constitution itself establishes and regulates in detail
the district courts, courts of appeal and the supreme court. The convention
provisions of Section 30 [of CP 6, which corresponds to art. V, § 26]." Section 30
included the reference to "in each judicial district a district attorney shall be elected
S. ."just as the final language of Section 26 does.
74. Compare LA. CONST. art. V, § 14 with La. Const. art. VII, §§81,91 (1921),
for the minor change this brings about. Under the old constitution, the civil district
court was deprived of jurisdiction in cases involving less than $100 in dispute, those
cases being allotted to the city courts.
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might well have stopped there, and provided for no other courts. Such
action was urged by a number of experts who appeared before the
Judiciary Committee, and would have provided a uniform three-tiered
judicial system under which each district court would hear all cases arising
within -its territorial jurisdiction. However, since such a model would have
required dismantling the existing specialized courts and courts of limited
jurisdiction, neither the committee nor the convention was willing to
impose it. With a committee and a convention composed of many local
government officials intent on preserving their "local" courts, the prospect of dismantling the city court and juvenile court structure was a dim
one. Indeed, the committee itself could not agree whether a three-tiered or
four-tiered system was most desirable.
What emerged from this process was a compromise provision which
continues the existing courts of specialized and limited jurisdiction, but
which restricts the establishment of similar ones in the future. The basic
provision in this regard is Section 1, which authorizes judicial power to be
vested only in such "other courts authorized by this Article." The inquiry
then becomes determining the other courts so authorized.
Section 15 authorizes the continuation of "family, juvenile, parish,
city, and magistrate courts existing on the effective date of this constitution." 75 In Orleans Parish, by virtue of Section 32, "the city, municipal,
traffic, and juvenile courts ...

.

are continued." Section 20 continues

"[m]ayors' courts and justice of the peace courts existing on the effective
date of this constitution." All of these existing courts are thus "authorized" within the meaning of Section 1 and continue to exist. However, they are given much less constitutional protection than the district
courts. The legislature, without the supermajority vote required for most
changes in the other courts, can abolish them outright or merge them into
the district courts.76 The constitution does not establish their jurisdiction or
75. The reference to the magistrate's court was added by amendment to continue such a court in Kenner, Louisiana. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 17, 1973 at 11-12. The
reference to parish courts is to the existing parish courts in Jefferson Parish, not to
the new type of parish court that is to be established in the future under the
authority granted in Section 15(A).
76. The convention rejected an amendment that would have increased the
power of local government agencies in regulating justices of the peace. A supporter
of the amendment objected to the committee proposal language which would
"require that whenever any particular local government wanted to either decrease
or increase the number of justices of the peace, they would have to go to the
legislature and get an act." !d. at 99. Action of the convention deleting the
amendment confirms the legislature's power in this regard. Id. at 101. Of course,
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otherwise regulate their structure and organization, allowing the legislature to do so.
One of the crucial votes occurred on the question of whether to allow
the legislature to abolish or merge these courts of limited and specialized
jurisdiction." As proposed by the Judiciary Committee, this legislative
power was recognized with respect to all but the Orleans Parish lower
level of courts.78 To abolish or merge the Orleans courts,\approval by the
legislature and by a referendum in the parish was required'. This disparity
in treatment of the Orleans lower courts was in obvious jeopardy since the
convention by that time had already reduced the twelve-year terms of
Orleans district judges and had provided for uniform six-year ternms for all
district judges. The first amendment seeking to end the disparity would
have imposed the referendum requirement in all parishes of the state. 79 If
that amendment had passed, the existing system would have been frozen
in so strongly that the legislature would have had little opportunity to
effectuate reform. As Delegate Albert Tate, Jr. effectively told the convention:
[T]his is the most important issue before us for judicial reform.
I'm telling you that if you pass this amendment, you might as well go
home as far as any possibility of this judicial article being any
improvement on the present. What we are trying to do, is not freeze
in courts that can be taken out, freeze in uniform statewide possibility
80
of reform.
under the prior constitution, the legislature was free to change the mayor's courts
and justices of the peace by legislative act. La. Const. art. VII, §§ 46-48, 50 (1921).
The committee and convention were aware that mayor's courts were in jeopardy under United States Constitutional standards. See Ward'v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
77. Committee Proposal 21, § 15, in JOURNAL, Aug. 17, 1973 at I, as presented
to the convention allowed abolition or merger of "trial courts of limited jurisdiction." A floor amendment was adopted to include courts of "specialized" jurisdiction to make clear that the legislature's power to merge or abolish courts would
extend to all courts below the district level and would include juvenile and family
courts. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 17, 1973 at 5-10.
78. Committee Proposal 21, § 15(A), in JOURNAL, Aug. 17, 1973 at 1,granted
the power to abolish or merge courts "except as provided in Section 35." Section 35
continued the courts of limited jurisdiction in Orleans Parish (city, municipal,
traffic and juvenile courts) subject to change only by action of the legislature and
approval by a referendum in Orleans Parish.
79. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 17, 1973 at 13-27.
80. Id. at 18.
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Other committee members rallied strongly against the amendment, Delegate Lawrence B. Sandoz telling the group, "As Judge Tate says, if we
have one provision in this entire article, that gives us room for judicial
reform in the future, it is this section." 8 ' The amendment was rejected by
a vote 35-81 82 The convention then acted to end the disparity by amending the section to subject the Orleans lower courts to the same change by
law provision applicable to the remainder of the state.83
Though the constitution does allow much legislative flexibility in
abolishing or merging these lower courts, and though it allows their
continuation until such legislative action, no such new courts can be
established by the legislature. The courts "authorized" in terms of Section
I are those "existing on the effective date of this constitution midnight
December 31, 1974.''84 That limited authorization does not authorize
establishment of any more courts' of that type.
The policy the convention accepted, and that the committee recommended, was to allow the legislature to move either to a uniform threetiered or four-tiered court system. In either system, uniformity is to be
encouraged; a helter-skelter fourth tier of courts of limited jurisdiction
with varied organization, powers and jurisdiction is to be avoided. To this
end, the only new courts of limited jurisdiction that can be established by
the legislature are those which the constitution authorizes in Section
15(A): "The legislature by law may establish trial courts of limited
jurisdiction with parishwide territorial jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction which shall be uniform throughout the state." As Committee
Chairman James L. Dennis made clear to the convention, the legislature
must establish any new courts below the district court level on a
parish wide basis with uniform jurisdiction over subject matter
throughout the state. It is our hope and aim in authorizing the
legislature in this manner, that they will move toward either

.

.

.

a

three-leveled or a four-leveled court system that will be uniform and
consistent throughout the state.85
Though unstated in the constitution, the fact that the existing fourth tier
courts are often staffed by part-time judges who also practice law, and that
mayors and justices of the peace are invariably not legally trained sup81. Id.at 23.
82. Id.at 27.
83. Id.at 44.

84.
85.

LA. CONST. art. V, §§ 15(A), 20.
PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 15, 1973 at 5.
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ported this policy choice. Though the convention did not end this situation, it did act to lessen its impact in the future by requiring that the new
parish court judges be trained in the law and not practice law. 86
It is also clear that no new courts of specialized jurisdiction, including family and juvenile courts, may be established by the legislature.
Though Section 15 continues in existence the family and juvenile courts
"existing on the effective date of this constitution," it does not "authorize" additional courts of that type, or in fact, any other type of
specialized courts. Section 18 is not to the contrary. In providing that
"juvenile and family courts shall have jurisdiction as provided by law," it
refers to jurisdiction and does not address itself to establishment of
additional courts, and applies to the jurisdiction of the family and juvenile
courts that are continued in existence by Section 15. This conclusion is
buttressed by Section 19, which in requiring special procedures for
juveniles accused of crime, speaks in terms of proceduresand not in terms
of special courts to administer those procedures. The special procedures
required by Section 19 may be provided by existing family and juvenile
courts, by district courts, by parish courts, or by city courts that are
continued.
Sections 18 and 19 resulted after bitter floor fights. Floor amendments were introduced to attempt to preserve the concept of juvenile
courts as institutions, but they were defeated and a requirement of special
procedures for juveniles was adopted.8 7 This is an important distinction for
the future of the administration of the court system. Whereas the prior
constitution combined concepts of special procedures with the existence of
special juvenile courts apart from the district courts,88 the new document
does not. It simply requires special procedures. This approach gives
protection to juveniles while not fragmenting the court system. Separate
86. LA. CONST. art. V, § 24.
87. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 28, 1973 at 3-38. Later, Delegate Proposal 43 by J.

Jackson sought to establish in the constitution the juvenile courts and their jurisdiction. It was amended and then defeated. Id., Jan. 8, 1974 at 64-106; Id., Nov. 16,
1973 at 13-22. The compromise provision calling for special juvenile procedures was
adopted. Id., Jan. 15, 1974 at 72-75, the sponsor of the proposal, Delegate Derbes,
saying: "I felt that was an adequate middle ground to satisfy both people. It didn't
prevent a unified court system . . . . Well, it is a completely different approach to
the problem. It has only to do with procedure, and it has nothing to do with
jurisdiction. It's, I think, a different approach, and one that is not nearly so
obstructive to the same problem." Id. at 62.
88. La. Const. art. VII, §§ 52-54 (1921) (as amended by La. Acts 1936, No. 324;
La. Acts 1938, No. 198; La. Acts 1948, No. 539; La. Acts 1956, No. 592; La. Acts
1964, No. 543).
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courts would lessen the flexibility of assignment of judges and arrangement of workload that is possible when only one district court hears all
types of cases.
The concept the constitution adopts, though it prevents
new
specialized courts, does not prevent district courts or parish courts from
being organized into specialized divisions. If the desirability of specialization by judges is recognized, this can be accommodated by having such
judges assigned primarily to such specialized divisions. But, such judges
would still be available for' assignment and rotation to other divisions of
the court depending on the workload in the different divisions. Specialized
divisions within the one court could handle family matters, small claims,
or traffic cases, all within the context of having one large court with
flexible resources and assignment powers depending on workload. 8 9
ADMINISTRATION OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM

Though the demands of localism were accommodated in the Judiciary
Article by provisions making it difficult for the legislature to change the
structure of the district courts, the necessity of statewide, centralized
control over the operations of the lower courts was also recognized, and
the constitution enhances the power of the supreme court to exercise
administrative control over the entire judicial system of the state. Two
groups of provisions in the constitution establish this power.
In Article II, Sections 1 and 2, the constitution continues the division
of governmental power into separate legislative, executive and judicial
branches and provides that no one branch shall exercise powers belonging
to the others. 9° Continuation of these provisions furnishes the basis for the
existence of some inherent powers in the courts which the legislature and
the executive cannot abridge. As the supreme court is the head of the
89. Chief Justice Joe Sanders appeared before the committee and explained
some of the possibilities in this regard: "With this approach, the Constitution would
create only one court at the trial level, the district court of general jurisdiction. Into
it would be merged the present judges of city and local courts, separate juvenile
courts, and family courts. These courts of special and limited jurisdiction would
cease to exist.
"The district court would have divisions established by court rule, thus providing maximum flexibility. For example, the court might well provide for the following divisions: criminal, civil, family, traffic, and small claims.
"[Traffic and small claims] would, of course, be authorized to hold hearings at
various places in the parishes as needed, utilizing when possible the courtroom
facilities of the present city courts." MINUTES, July 23, 1973 at 4 (appendix).
90. La. Const. art. II, §§ 1, 2 (1921). See PROCEEDINGS, Jan. 3, 1974 at 83, 84.
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judicial system, it is the final arbiter of the exercise of those inherent
judicial powers. While the extent of these inherent powers is not defined,
review,
they include powers of administration, the power of judicial
91
power over officers of the court, and the contempt power.
Article V grants additional power to the supreme court. Section 5(A)
grants it "general supervisory jurisdiction over all other courts," providing the basis for the court's discretionary jurisdiction to review decisions
of lower courts as well as its administrative control over those courts. The
section also provides that the supreme court "may establish procedural
and administrative rules not in conflict with law and may assign a sitting or
retired judge to any court.' 92
The result, then, is that the supreme court possesses, free of executive and legislative control, power within the inherent powers concept,
general supervisory power over all other courts, and the power to assign
judges. Moreover, it also is given an additional grant of administrative and
91. Had the contempt power not been considered an unlimited inherent power
of the courts, no need would have existed for providing in Article V, Section 2,
"The power to punish for contempt of court shall be limited by law." See PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 15, 1973 at 11, where Chairman Dennis stated: "We have proceeded
upon the traditional theory that the power to punish is, for contempt of court, is
inherent in the court but that the reasonable limitations may be placed upon it by
legislative act."
Establishing an inherent power over admission to the bar and over defining the
practice of law are Ex Parte Steckler, 179 La. 410, 154 So. 41 (1934), and Meunier v.
Bernich, 170 So. 567 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1936). Especially interesting is an early
case questioning the power of the district court to order the sheriff to barricade a
street near the courthouse to prevent passage of noisy traffic. In City of New
Orleans v. Bell Sheriff, 14 La. Ann. 214 (1859), the court quoted with approval from
the district court: "Considering that the Judges in the City of New Orleans are
vested with full power to regulate the police of their courts and to prevent such
noise within the precincts of their courts, as might disturb the administration of
justice; and considering further, that the continual passage of horses and vehicles at
the corner of St. Anne and Conde streets, creates such a noise as to disturb the
business of the First District Court of New Orleans," and affirmed the order.
92. La. Const. art. VII, § 10 (1921) gave the supreme court "control of, and
general supervision over all inferior courts." The formula of Section V of the new
document is "general supervisory jurisdiction over all other courts" and adds the
new language that it may establish procedural and administrative rules not in
conflict with law. The deletion of the words "control of" was largely stylistic; the
addition of the new rule-making powers indicates an expansion rather than a
limitation of the court's powers over other elements of the judicial system. This
intent is fortified by the convention votes on proposals to limit the court's powers.
See notes 96-102, infra.
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procedural rule-making power that is subject to legislative overview in that
93
such rules cannot conflict with law.
The enhanced rule-making power, by its terms, encompasses both
administrative and procedural rules. This power extends to adopting rules
or codes of procedure similar to that of the United States Supreme Court. 94
The scope of the administrative and procedural rules is not limited, except
that they cannot conflict with law.
That these powers were meant to be assigned to the supreme court
and intended to be broad is made clear by convention rejection of amendments to delete from the committee proposal the power to establish
procedural and administrative rules. The amendment to accomplish that,
as well as to limit the power to assign judges, was soundly defeated by a
21-93 vote, following a debate which clearly posed the issue.95 Explaining
his amendment to limit the court, Delegate Joseph A. Conino stated:
We do not feel that the Supreme Court should administer to the
local courts and should tell the court how to operate the administrative part of its court. The committee proposal gives absolute and total
power to the Supreme Court. The judicial administrator of the Supreme Court could become a Tsar and go down and snoop in the
records of the local courts and thereby create problems on a local
level. .

.

.That's right. It [the amendment] would reduce the Su-

96
preme Court's power as far as the administration of the local courts.

Speaking against the amendment, Delegate James G. Derbes stated:
The real question at hand is whether or not we are to have some
centralized authority to supervise our judicial system or will our
judicial system be fragmented into a series of minor fiefdoms where
one judge perhaps is not one to accede to certain demands or necessities in another section of court.97

Judiciary Committee Chairman James Dennis spoke in favor of "the
Supreme Court's right to make reasonable rules as to the administration of
justice in the state-as how long you can take to decide a case and
93. The language choice indicated that the court need not wait for legislative
authorization to act. If the laws of the state are silent on a particular point, a
supreme court rule covering that point would not conflict with law and would thus
be permissible.
94. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771-72 (1975).
95. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 15, 1973 at 61.
96. Id.at 53, 55.
97. Id.at 58.
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reporting to the Supreme Court about case loads and things of this nature
98
which are essential to efficient management of the entire court system.When asked whether the court would have the power to make a judge
99
decide a case, Dennis answered "Yes."
This broad power in the supreme court provides a basis for substantial
improvement in court efficiency by allowing it to establish rules governing
the operations of all courts in the state. As new technology becomes
available, the supreme court can order its implementation and facilitate its
use. If lower court operations are deficient, the supreme court has the
power to establish rules to correct those deficiencies. The court can move
toward a truly integrated court system by exercising its power to order
lower courts to establish divisions, assign judges, etc. This administrative
power, as society becomes more concerned about the effectiveness of the
courts, may be the constitution's most important innovation in the
judiciary article. The new document, at the least, reflects a desire for more
centralized control over the lower courts, not only in matters of substantive law, but also in the manner the lower courts conduct their affairs
procedurally and administratively.
The power of the supreme court to "assign a sitting or retired judge to
any court'"'10 is broadened somewhat; the new provision has no limitations as to which judges can be assigned to which courts as the predecessor
provision did.'' An attempt was made to amend the committee proposal
to provide that a judge could be assigned only with his consent and the
consent of a majority of the court to which he would be assigned. The
amendment was defeated 26-83.o2
Section 6 mandates the chief justice to implement the supreme court's
administrative powers: "He is the chief administrative officer of the
judicial system of the state. .

.

... However, he must exercise his powers

"subject to rules adopted by the court.' '103 Opposition developed to the
proposal to name the chief justice the administrator of the judicial system
of the state, and an amendment was introduced to specify that he would be
98. Id. at 59.
99. Id. at 60. See also Baton Rouge State Times, March 23, 1973, at I-B, col. 2,
reporting on a meeting at which an Institute of Judicial Administration study was
discussed by district judges. A committee studying the report recommended that
the supreme court be given procedural rule making authority with the rules subject
to change by the legislature.
100.

LA. CONST. art. V, § 5(A).

101.

See La. Const. art. VII, § 12 (1921).

102.

PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 15, 1973 at 74.

103.

LA. CONST. art. V, § 6.
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the administrative officer of the supreme court, rather than of the entire
judicial system. Delegate Ambroise H. Landry, explained his amendment:
[B]ut my district judges oppose this Paragraph B with the fear that
many years to come that by saying that the chief administrative
officer of the judicial system is not limited to the Supreme Court, but
could be so far-reaching to where the chief justice would come into a
local parish and tell the district judges how they will manage their

affairs. 104
The issue of the extent of centralized control was clearly posed again in
this debate. Delegate I. Jackson Burson, Jr., in opposition to the amendment, said:
It is well known that we have had occasions in this state where
district judges simply were not doing their work. And you need
someone in the judicial system with the authority to bring them to toe
and require them to do their work.° 5
The amendment was defeated and the committee language remained
intact, 106 providing additional evidence of the convention's aim of establishing strong central authority to administer the entire court system.
The committee struggled with the method of selecting the chief
justice. 07 The fact that the seniority system had recently resulted in three
chief justices in a ten month period, and the fear of the destabilizing effect
such turnover could have on judicial administration concerned many
members. An Institute of Judicial Administration study questioned selection by seniority and had suggested election by the justices as an alternative. ' Early in its deliberations, the committee did opt for election of the
104. PROCEEDINGs, Aug. 16, 1973 at 22.

105. Id. at 25.
106. Id.at 28.
107. The working papers of the committee, in Draft A, Section 8, comments
stated: "the committee might suggest some alternative. For instance, to avoid the
superannuated chief justice who continues to serve only in order to attain the title,
perhaps the senior justice below sixty-five (sixty?) years of age, should succeed.
Again, since the chief justice has administrative functions and perhaps should be
chosen for administrative ability rather than age, perhaps whenever a vacancy
occurs the court should be authorized to elect a chief justice from its membership
for a term long enough to provide leadership and direction (e.g., seven years?),
eligible to succeed himself. We have been fortunate in that our longterm chief
justices have possessed administrative ability (Chief Justice Sanders is an outstanding example), and perhaps should not tamper with fate; on the other hand, by the
chance of a few days or months of seniority, the court system could be saddled with
a longterm chief justice with no interest in administration."
108. Baton Rouge State Times, March 23, 1973, at I-B, col. 2.
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chief justice by the members of the supreme court, but soon after, Justice
Frank W. Summers appeared before the committee and strongly urged
retention of the seniority system to avoid possible infighting on the court
and to minimize political influences possibly affecting selection of a chief

justice. ° The committee then reversed its position and adopted a modified seniority system under which the judge Senior in service would
become chief justice if he was below the age of 65 at the time a vacancy
was to be filled. l ° Ultimately, however, .the convention adopted an
amendment deleting the 65-year limitation and continuing the existing

straight seniority system.'I' A later attempt to provide for the court's
electing its chief justice was defeated by 44-71.112
Of course, if the senior judge in service does not want the administrative duties, he could delegate or share them with another judge of the

court more interested in administration. There is no prohibition against a
judge declining the office of chief justice but remaining on the court, with

the next judge in seniority becoming chief justice.
Though Section 7 does not require a judicial administrator, as did the
prior provisions, 11 3 it provides that the supreme court "may select a
judicial administrator" to assist the court in carrying out its administrative
duties. The section also allows the court to select its clerk and other

personnel and to "prescribe their duties." The committee proposal would
also have allowed the court to prescribe the compensation of its employees, but that power was deleted by amendment to make clear that the
109. MINUTES, Apr. 21, 1973 at 2; Id., May 12, 1973 at 2. Baton Rouge Sunday
Advocate, June 17, 1973 at 3-B, col. 3; Id., May 14, 1973, at 5-A, col. 1.
110. MINUTES, June 16, 1973 at 2, 3; Baton Rouge Sunday Advocate, June 17,
1973 at 3-B, col. 3. Committee Proposal 21, § 6, in JOURNAL, Aug. 16, 1973 at 2;
Committee Proposal 6, § 6, in JOURNAL, July 6, 1973 at 15. Supporting the committee proposal, Chairman Dennis explained: "The defects in having him be selected
solely by seniority are first of all, you encourage people who might have retired at
65, to stay on the court just for the hope of getting that honorable title. Second, you
run the danger of the situation that we had recently of a rapid turnover of three
chief justices in a ten-month period. Third, you might have someone who is
physically and mentally able to be a justice, but not physically up to the task of
being chief administrative officer in addition to being a voting and writing justice of
the Supreme Court." PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 16, 1973 at 4.

111. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 16, 1973 at 7-14. Delegate B.B. Rayburn spoke effectively of not depriving an elderly man of having the honor of being chief justice for
some time at least.
112. Id. at 15-21.
113. La. Const. art. VII, § 12.1 (1921) (continued as a statute by art. XIV, § 16(5)
and incorporated as LA. R.S. 13:10 by La. Acts 1975, No. 136).
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power to set salaries and to appropriate state funds is a legislative
function. 114
The concern with efficient court administration did not end with the
supreme court. Section 12 provides that the senior judge of each court of
appeal shall be chief judge of that court and "shall administer the court
subject to rules adopted by it." The prior law did not contain that
statement of administrative duties," 5 and the convention defeated an
amendment that sought to delete the reference to the administrative role
of the chief judge by a vote of 12-99.II6
Concern for administration on the district court level is shown in the
new requirement of Section 17 that each district court "shall elect from
its members a chief judge who shall exercise, for a term designated by the
court, the administrative functions prescribed by rule of court." Initially,
the committee proposed that the district courts "may" elect a chief judge,
but later versions of its draft changed the language to the mandatory
"shall." 1 7 The position of chief judge of a district court being a new one
in the constitution and thus not involving existing expectations of reaching
that office as was the case with the chief justice and chief judge of a
'-'114. *Committee Proposal 21, § 7, in JOURNAL, Aug. 16, 1973 at 3. PROCEEDINGS,
Aug. 16, 1973 at 30-36. The debate pointed out the committee view that though the
court would set the salary level, legislative control remained because the legislature
could withhold appropriation of those funds and no state funds can be spent without
appropriation. Delegate Camille Gravel, however, wanted to avoid the possibility
that "the judicial administrator would have a valid, legal claim under the constitution to recover that money from the state" even if no appropriation were made. Id.
at 31. LA. R.S. 13:(10) (Supp. 1975) allows the supreme court to set the salary of the
judicial administrator.
115. La. Const. art. VII, § 23 (1921) (as amended by La. Acts 1958, No. 561)
provided for a presiding judge but did not assign him administrative duties.
116. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 16, 1973 at 93-94. That debate also makes clear that the
chief judge can assign the administrative duties to another judge or to a judicial
administrator.
The committee recommended, as with the chief justice, selection of the chief
judge on a modified seniority basis-the judge oldest in point of service below the
age of 65 would succeed to a vacancy in the office. As the selection method of the
chief justice had been changed earlier, selection of the chief judges was changed to
a straight seniority selection.
Section 13 continues provisions allowing the courts of appeal to select their
clerks and other personnel and to prescribe their duties. Deleted is the provision of
the prior law requiring the governing authority of the parish in which a court of
appeal is located to provide facilities for the court; this will be handled by legislation
rather than being constitutional detail.
117. Committee Proposal 21, § 17, in JOURNAL, Aug. 17, 1973 at 7; Committee
Proposal 6, § 17, in JOURNAL, July 6, 1973 at 16. MINUTES, Aug. 8, at 2; id., May 11,
1973 at 3-4.
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court of appeal, the convention accepted the committee's recommendation
8
that he be elected."1
JURISDICTION OF COURTS

GeneralPowers of Courts and Judges

As stated earlier, the separation of powers doctrine reflected in
Article II recognizes the existence of some inherent powers in the judicial
branch of government. These inherent powers associated with the essence
of the judicial function vest not in the supreme court alone, but in all
courts. Such would be the case without the constitution saying more.
Section 2 of Article V, however, goes further and restates the principle in
specific language; it recognizes the power of a judge to issue "writs of
habeas corpus and all other needful writs, orders and process in aid of the
jurisdiction of his court." In the supreme court and court of appeal, such
orders by one judge are subject to review by the whole court. Review by
the whole court is not provided for in the case of district judge orders,
thus keeping the concept of district courts acting normally through one
judge, and not through multi-member panels.
Section 2 condenses the language of Article VII, Section 2 of the
1921 constitution without making essential changes; the detailed enumeration of writs of the predecessor provision was unnecessary in light of the
reference to "all other needful writs, orders and process."119 The reference here to writs of habeas corpus is not the constitution's primary
recognition of a citizen's right to the writ; Article I, Section 21 provides
unequivocally, "The writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended." 20
Section 2 also continues the provision of Article XIX, Section 17 of
the 1921 constitution requiring that the power to punish for contempt be
limited by law. This provision, too, reflects the view that the contempt
power is inherent in the courts and could not be limited but for this
authorization and mandate to do so. In light of this relation to the inherent
powers concept, there is a basis for the chairman of the judiciary committee having indicated to the convention that any legislative limitation of the
contempt power be "reasonable."' 2' If the power to limit were construed
118. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 17, 1972 at 80-86.
119. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 15, 1973 at 11; Comment to Committee Proposal6, § 2,
in JOURNAL, July 6, 1973 at 9: "No essential change except to simplify language."

La. Const. art. VII, § 2 (1921) referred to "writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto, and all other needful writs, orders and process ...
"
120. See Hargrave, The Declarationof Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of
1974, 35 LA. L. REV. 1, 65 (1975).
121. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 15, 1973 at 11.
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to be unlimited, it could conceivably allow the legislature to so drastically
limit the contempt power as to interfere 'with the separation of powers
doctrine and the inherent needs of the judicial system, a result that would
be incompatible with Article II, Sections 1 and 2.
Reflecting common terminology, the chairman of the Judiciary
Committee indicated to the convention that a mayor serving on a mayor's
court or a justice of the peace is not included in Section 2's reference to
"a judge"' and that those officials do not partake of the grant of power of
the section. 122 The corresponding provision of the 1921 constitution did
not include them either; it referred to the supreme court, courts of appeal
and district judges.' 23 The reference to a "judge" however, would
include judges of city courts, and the chairman so indicated in answer to a
question posed on the convention floor.' 24 This is consistent with the
terminology used in the Judiciary Article, for Section'15(C) refers to a
"city court judge." Including city court judges within the provision
expands it slightly.
As the prior constitution did, the new document establishes the
jurisdiction of the appellate and district courts in detail. Jurisdiction of the
courts of specialized and limited jurisdiction, however, is not constitutionally fixed and is subject to substantial legislative control.
Jurisdictionof the Supreme Court
Article V, Section 5 specifies the supreme court's original, supervisory and appellate jurisdiction. The distinction between supervisory and
125
appellate jurisdiction is a continuation of existing terminology,
"supervisory" referring to the court's discretionary jurisdiction under
which it has the power to select the cases it will hear, and "appellate"
122. Id. Chairman Dennis said, "but I believe the answer is that the J.P.'s and
Mayors are not classified as judges anywhere in this article so this would refer only
to judges of city courts, special courts, district and on up."
However, see Sledge v. McClathery, 324 So. 2d 354 (La. 1975), which holds
that the mayor has authority to appoint counsel for indigents appearing before the
mayor's court when counsel is required under Article 1, Section 13. In the opinion,
the court indicates, without discussion of the convention proceedings, that mayor's
courts are included within 'the powers mentioned in Article V, Section 2. The case

may well be bottomed more on Article 1, Section 13, or on some concept of inherent
power, or on the powers of the supreme court tor
make rules for the entire judicial
system, than on Article V,'Section 2.
123.

La. Const. art. VII, § 2 (1921).

124. See note 4, supra.
125.

561).

See La. Const. art. VII, § 10 (1921) (as amended by La. Acts 1958, No.
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contemplating cases in which a party as a matter of right can demand that
12 6
the court hear a case.
Clearly, since the constitution itself grants specific jurisdiction to the
supreme court, the legislature is prohibited from depriving the court of
that jurisdiction. It is less clear, however, whether the legislature by law
can add to the supreme court's jurisdiction. The problem is primarily
whether the legislature can grant appeals of right when the constitution
does not do so. The problem was raised in State v. James12 7 by the
supreme court expropriomotu and although the opinion is not exhaustive,
the court indicated by a 4-3 vote that the legislature could not do so.
The case holds unconstitutional a statute granting the state a right of
appeal from a judgment sustaining a motion to quash an indictment,' 128 a
type of appeal that is not contemplated in the constitutional grant of
jurisdiction to the supreme court. The committee and convention debates
do little to clarify the issue; in fact, the exact problem does not seem to
have been the subject of much consideration during the convention
process.
Supporting the view that the legislature does have authority to add to
the court's constitutional jurisdiction is the principle that" [t]he provisions
of a state constitution are limitations on the power of the people
exercised through the legislature; what is not prohibited by the constitution
is permitted.' ' 29 Since no prohibition against additional jurisdiction
by law is contained in the constitution, it is arguable that the legislature
can so act. On the other hand is a construction of the constitutional grant
as an implied prohibition against additional jurisdiction that would parallel
the Marshall analysis in Marbury v. Madison: "Affirmative words are
often, 91130
in their operation, negative of other objects than those affirmed
.. , '
so that:

When an instrument organizing fundamentally a judicial
system, divides it into one supreme, and so many inferior courts
126. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 15, 1973 at 51, where Chairman D6e6hnis explained to the
convention: "Subparagraph (D) provides for cases which are appealable of right to
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court by virtue of its supervisory jurisdiction can
hear any case that it chooses that arises in the Louisiana court system, however,
Subparagraph (D) says that it must hear these kind of cases. It must grant the appeal
and hear the case described in Subparagraph (D) .
127. 329 So. 2d 713 (La. 1976).
128.

LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 912(B).

129. General Guidelines No. 1, Manual on Style and Drafting, 1 JOURNAL 769.
See State v. James, 329 So. 2d 713, 717 (La. 1976) (Tate, J., concurring); Hainkel v.
Henry, 313 So. 2d 577 (La. 1975).
130. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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.; then enumerates its powers, and proceeds so far as to

distribute them, as to define the jurisdiction of the supreme
court by declaring the cases in which it shall take [supervisory]
jurisdiction, and that in others it shall take appellate jurisdiction;
the plain import of the words seems to be that in one class of
cases its jurisdiction is [supervisory] and not appellate; in the
13
other it is appellate, and not [supervisory].'
Consistent with this view is some indication of a constitutional purpose of
decreasing the appeals of right to the supreme court. The prior document
granted appellate jurisdiction in five classes of cases whereas the new
constitution grants it in three,' 32 thus reducing the time and effort the
court would have to spend on appeals of right which may not involve
substantial legal questions, and allowing it to concentrate more on its role
of guiding the development of the law by deciding the important cases it,
in its discretion, selects. This purpose was reflected in Draft A, the
committee's working draft, where it was indicated:
the direct civil appeals to the supreme court have been restricted
to instances where legislative action has been declared unconstitutional, in view of Chief Justice Sanders' recommendation.
Also, in accordance with same; the monetary threshold in criminal
appeals has been raised from three hundred to five hundred
dollars.

133

Yet while this is good policy in terms of the function of the supreme
court, and while allowing the legislature to require the court to hear a
large class of additional appeals would tend to defeat its role as a "writ
court," one can question whether such was a strong convention policy.
The convention voted not to relieve the court of hearing appeals in cases
where ordinances had been declared unconstitutional when that issue was
put to it,' 34 and refused to relieve the court of appeals of right in most
135
criminal cases.
Perhaps the strongest support for legislative power to add to the
court's appeals jurisdiction is a change in language from the predecessor
provision of Section 5(D). Article VII, Section 10 of the former constitu131. Id. at 175.
132. Compare La. Const. art. VII, § 10 (1921) with LA. CONST. arts. IV, § 21(E)
and V, § 5(D).

133. Draft A, Section 6 (comments).
134. See note 148, infra.

135. See note 150, infra.
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tion provided, "[t]he following cases only shall be appealable to the
Supreme Court. . . .," making it clear that the legislature could not
enlarge the listing. However, the new provision omits the reference to
"only" and simply provides "a case shall be appealable to the supreme
court if...."
Deletion of "only" is certainly a change, a change
which, arguably, removes the prior prohibition against legislative additions of jurisdiction. The available convention documents do not refer to
this change. The change first appears in the initial committee working
draft, Draft A, and follows through to the final language adopted by the
convention, but the comments and debate do not emphasize the effect of
the change.' 36 Normally, such an intentional, drastic change would have
been brought to the attention of the convention through memoranda or in
the debate.
137
The majority in State v. James relied primarily on State v. Murphy
for the proposition that the legislature could not enlarge the court's
appellate jurisdiction; however, since Murphy was decided under the old
constitution which included the reference to "only," the case should not
138
be dispositive.
If one looks more closely at the language of Section 5(D), other
changes appear that seem to support the James result. The section
provides, "In addition to other appeals provided by this constitution, a
case shall be appealable to the supreme court if....
."Reference to "by
this constitution" indicates that additional appeals are allowed only if so
provided in the constitution and cannot be provided by law. And, when
the constitution meant to recognize legislative power, it clearly did so, as
in the next subparagraph, Section 5(E), which in referring to other
criminal matters recognized a "right of appeal or review, as provided by
law.",
Also, the statement of jurisdiction of the supreme court when
analyzed in conjunction with the statement of the jurisdiction of the courts
of appeal provides support for the view that the legislature cannot enlarge
the supreme court's jurisdiction. Section 5 refers to the cases "appealable
to the supreme court," then Section 10 grants the courts of appeal
appellate jurisdiction "except in cases appealable to the supreme
136.

See Draft A, Section 6(d) reproduced in

DOCUMENTS OF THE LOUISIANA

CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973, RELATIVE TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1042, 1043 [hereinafter cited as DOCUMENTS]; Committee Propos-

al 21, § 5(D); Committee Proposal 6, § 5(D).
137. 254 La. 873, 227 So. 2d 915 (1969).
138. It appears that footnote 1 in the opinion is in error in quoting Article VII,
Section 10, for that quotation omits "only."
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This repetition of the exact language is consistent with the

view that the constitution itself has apportioned the appellate jurisdiction
among courts and the legislature is not free to change it. But again, the
constitution has not granted appeals of right by the state in any criminal
matter, and this position would have to accept the view that the constitution meant this to be, without power in the legislature to grant such an
appeal to any court.
Further consideration of the jurisdictional provisions with respect to
the courts of appeal and the district court raise other difficulties. In civil
cases, appellate jurisdiction in matters not included in Section 5 as
appealable to the supreme court is constitutionally vested in the courts of
appeal. The legislature probably cannot divest the courts of appeal of that
jurisdiction. If it were then to grant appellate jurisdiction to the supreme
court in those cases, the jurisdiction would have to be concurrent with the
courts of appeal. Such would not promote judicial efficiency. It is also
possible, in such a situation, for a litigant to have, two appeals of right, a
result inconsistent with the general purpose of requiring the supreme
court to hear only the most important cases, and then on appeal from the
district court without having the case heard by a court of appeal.
Additionally, if one accepts legislative power to enlarge the appellate
jurisdiction of the supreme court, that same reasoning would allow it
to enlarge that of the courts of appeal. It would follow that the legislature
can grant the courts of appeal appellate jurisdiction in all criminal matters,
resulting in the same problem of concurrent appellate jurisdiction
just discussed, besides being at odds with a clear convention decision
not
39
to grant criminal jurisdiction to the intermediate appellate courts.'
Legislative power, under this argument, would also exist to enlarge
the original jurisdiction of the supreme court. But since Section 16 vests
original 'jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases in the district courts,
jurisdiction which probably cannot be taken away, the result would again
probably be concurrent jurisdiction in both the district and supreme
courts, a result again at odds with judicial efficiency and the concept of
the supreme court as primarily an appellate writ court.
Fortunately, the constitution is clearer in delineating the jurisdiction
that it does grant the supreme court. Section 5(A) grants it "general
supervisory jurisdiction over all other courts," continuing its extensive
14
discretionary power to review any and all cases from lower courts. 0
139. See note 165, infra.
140. La. Const. art. VII, § 10 (1921).

PROCEEDINGS,

Aug. 15, 1973 at 51.
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Section 2 allows the court to issue all writs and orders to implement this
grant of jurisdiction.
Section 5(B) continues the court's "exclusive original jurisdiction of
disciplinary proceedings against a member of the bar." It was not necessary to specify, as did the prior provisions, the power to suspend or
disbar, for the power to impose sanctions as part of the disciplinary
proceedings is both implicit and inherent. Discontinued is the provision in
the prior law granting original jurisdiction of suits to remove judges.141
The removal by suit procedure does not apply to judges, 142 and Section
25's removal procedure upon recommendation of the judiciary commission itself establishes the powers of the supreme court in that regard. It
was also not necessary to state that the court would have original jurisdiction for the determination of questions of fact affecting its appellate
jurisdiction in a pending case; 143 that power is implied and inherent and,
even if it were not, Section 2 recognizes it.
The convention accepted the committee's policy of decreasing the
mandatory appellate jurisdiction of the court. Deleted from the new
statement of the court's appellate jurisdiction are election suits covering
more than one court of appeal circuit, and cases in which the constitutionality or legality of any tax is contested.144 These matters now fall in the
court of appeal appellate jurisdiction, 45 and are also within the supreme
court's discretionary supervisory jurisdiction. Though Section 5 deletes
mandatory appellate jurisdiction over cases in which Public Service
Commission orders are in contest, Article IV, Section 21(E) does provide
for direct appeal from the district court of such actions.
Section 5(D) continues mandatory appellate jurisdiction over cases
in which "a law or ordinance has been declared unconstitutional." A
committee working draft had proposed that the appellate jurisdiction be
limited to cases in which a state law had been declared unconstitutional,"
141. La. Const. art. VII, § 10 (1921): "It has exclusive original jurisdiction of
• . . suits for the removal from office of judges of courts of record as elsewhere
provided in this constitution ....
"
142. LA. CONST. art. X, § 25.
143. La. Const. art. VII, § 10 (1921).
144. La. Const. art. VII, §§ 10(1), 10(4) (1921). Committee Proposal 6, § 5, in
JOURNAL, Aug. 15, 1973 at 6, 9, 10. Of course, if a statute enacting a tax were

declared unconstitutional, an appeal would lie. Removed is the right of appeal when
the contested tax is upheld. See Southland Corp. v. Collector, 318 So. 2d 23 (La.
1975).
145. LA. CONST. art. V, § 10.
146. The prior law referred to "an ordinance of a parish, municipal corporation,
board or subdivision of the state." La. Const. art. VII, § 10 (1921). Draft A, Section
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but a later draft restored the reference to ordinances, 147 and the
convention itself defeated a floor amendment that would have deleted that
48
reference. 1
Section 5(D) also vests in the supreme court mandatory appellate
jurisdiction of criminal cases in which "the defendant has been convicted
of a felony or a fine exceeding five hundred dollars or imprisonment
exceeding six months actually has been imposed." Corresponding to this
is Section 10 which establishes the constitutional jurisdiction of the courts
of appeal only in civil and juvenile cases. Thus, the constitution does not
provide intermediate appellate review of criminal matters and assigns the
supreme court sole jurisdiction over the bulk of the criminal appeals. This
was not a wise decision. The growing criminal appellate workload is
overburdening the court, forcing it to hear appeals that do not involve
substantial legal questions, and resulting in the court spending inadequate
time on its function of guiding the development of the law by concentrating on major legal questions.
The failure to reapportion the criminal appellate jurisdiction resulted
partly from lack of agreement on how to restructure those appeals and
partly from the opposition of court of appeal judges who resisted being
granted criminal jurisdiction. 149 A committee working draft had
suggested continuing supreme court appellate jurisdiction in criminal
cases, but allowing the legislature to transfer that jurisdiction to the courts
of appeal or to such other intermediate appellate court the legislature
might create.' 50 This suggestion was not accepted and not made part of
the committee's proposals.
Section 5(D) continues the prior law in that a defendant has a right of
appeal to the supreme court in all felony convictions regardless of the
6 omitted the reference to ordinances, the comment explaining that "direct civil
appeals to the supreme court have been restricted to instances where legislative
action has been declared unconstitutional in view of Chief Justice Sanders' recommendation." Committee Proposal 6, § 5, in JOURNAL, July 6, 1973 at 15. See also
MINUTES, Apr. 20, 1973 at 6.
147. Committee Proposal 21, § 5, in JOURNAL, Aug. 15, 1973 at 6-7. See also
MINUTES, July 27, 1973.
148. The floor amendment sponsored by Justice Albert Tate was defeated by a
vote of 27-82. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 15, 1973, at 84.
149. E.g., Baton Rouge State Times, March 9, 1973, at I-B, col. 1, reporting that
Judge Minos D. Miller of the Third Circuit Court of Appeal appeared before the
judiciary committee urging that the courts of appeal not be granted criminal juris-

diction. He suggested that if criminal appeals become too burdensome for the
supreme court, the problem could be cured with a constitutional amendment.
150. Draft A, Section 6(e). MINUTES, Apr. 20, 1973 at 6.
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penalty imposed, and in misdemeanor cases in which imprisonment
exceeding six months actually has been imposed. 5 ' In other misdemeanors, the right exists if a fine exceeding $500 is imposed; this raises
the prior provision's $300 threshold. 5I 2 These provisions were adopted
without substantial changes in the committee proposal. No provision is
153
made for appeals by the state in criminal matters.
Providing some type of review of misdemeanor convictions in which
no right of appeal to the supreme court was granted did cause difficulty.
Involved here are misdemeanor convictions in district courts and courts of
limited jurisdiction in which the punishment actually imposed is six
months imprisonment or less or a fine of $500 or less. The committee's
first draft proposal made no provision for review of such cases. 15 4 That
failure to at least mandate some type of review caused concern about
inadequate protection of individual rights. Complicating the problem was
a desire not to constitutionalize trial de novo of matters heard in courts of
limited jurisdiction as the prior constitution did. 155 The result was a
provision in a later committee draft which added, "In other criminal
cases, an accused shall have a right of appeal or review as provided by
law or by rule of the supreme court not inconsistent therewith."' 56 This
was changed by floor amendment to delete the power of the supreme
court to provide for such review by rule, thus requiring that the appeal or
review mechanism be provided by law, and to put the remaining language
in a separate subsection because, "I was afraid by leaving it in Subsection
151. Of no effect on the court's jurisdiction was an amendment which changed
the committee proposal's reference from cases "in which the death penalty or
imprisonment at hard labor may be imposed" to the simpler reference to one
"convicted of a felony." The purpose of the change was to remove the reference to
the death penalty and thus remove the possible inference that the constitution
authorized the death penalty. In fact, the constitution does not address itself
specifically to whether the death penalty is allowed, although it does prevent
"cruel, excessive or unusual punishment." LA. CONST. art. I, § 20. See Hargrave,
supra note 120, at 1, 62. Of course, as "felony" is not defined in the constitution,
legislative changes in the definition of the term could change the court's jurisdiction. See State v. Moore, 311 So. 2d 875 (La. 1975); State v. Robertson, 310 So. 2d
619 (La. 1975).
152. La. Const. art. VII, § 10 (1921).
153. See State v. James, 329 So. 2d 713 (La. 1976). See also the text accompany-

ing note 127, supra.
154.

See Committee Proposal 6, § 5 in DOCUMENTS at 59.

155. See PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 15, 1973 at 89; La. Const. art. VII, § 36 (1921) (as
amended by La. Acts 1956, No. 607 and by La. Acts 1958, No. 561).
156. Committee Proposal21, § 5(D)(2), in JOURNAL, Aug. 15, 1973 at 6, 7.
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2 here that it might be inferred that those appeals would have to go to the
57
Supreme court."
The result of this process was to provide in a separate paragraph
what has become Section 5(E): "In all criminal cases not provided in
Paragraph (D)(2) of this Section, (cases appealable to the supreme court),
a defendant has a right of appeal or review, as provided by law." The
unqualified "as provided by law" language is an unlimited grant to the
legislature and gives it a number of options. Convictions in courts of
limited jurisdiction could be appealed to, or reviewed by, the district
court, either by reviewing the record or by trial de novo. 51 1 In these cases,
as well as in cases from district courts not appealable to the supreme
court, the appeal or review could be with the court of appeal. Even
though Section 10 establishes only civil jurisdiction in those courts, the
grant of jurisdiction in that section is made "except as otherwise provided
by this constitution." That "except" clause relates back to the grant of
legislative power in Section 5(E) to provide for appeal or review as the
legislature might decide. That this is so is also made clear by the
structural change discussed earlier whereby Section 5(E) was made a
separate section to make sure that the appeal or review need not necessarily be in the supreme court. 59 It is also possible, of course, for the
legislature to provide that such cases be heard by the supreme court.
Regardless of which court is assigned these cases, it is not the
normal appeals procedure that is necessarily required; it is appeal or
review that is required. Review could be by some type of appellate
examination of a record that is less than the full blown appeal with full
briefs and oral argument.
The limited nature of the right of appeal or review in these minor
criminal cases prompted further action when the convention was considering the bill of rights. Additional protection for the individual in such
cases is provided in Article I, Section 19: "No person shall be subjected
to imprisonment or forfeiture of rights or property without the right of
judicial review based upon a complete record of all evidence upon which
the judgment is based."''
A number of provisions outside the judiciary article also provide for
supreme court jurisdiction. Under Article III, Section 6, if the legislature
157. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 15, 1973 at 88. See also id. at 89-92.
158. LA. CoNsT. art. V, § 16(B) provides: "A district court shall have appellate
jurisdiction as provided by law."
159. See note 157, supra, and accompanying text.
160. See Hargrave, supra note 120 at 1, 60.
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fails to reapportion itself after each decennial federal census, "the supreme court, upon petition of any elector, shall reapportion the representation in each house .

. .

."

The provision allows a type of original

proceeding in the court, but under Section 6(C), "the procedure for
review and for petition shall be provided by law."161
Article IV, Section 17 governing declarations of inability to serve by
state officials provides the supreme court shall determine the issue of
inability to serve "by preference and with priority over all other matters."
Section 11 allows a court of appeal to certify any question of law
before it to the supreme court. This is a continuation of the prior law with
no essential change, 162 as is the provision that the court upon certification
can give its binding instruction or decide the case itself. The section
passed as proposed by the committee without amendment after a debate
which indicated that the provision was not addressing the question of
whether federal courts could certify questions to the state supreme
court. 163

And finally, Section 5(F) continues the prior law that the supreme
court has appellate jurisdiction over all issues involved in a civil action
164
properly before it.

Jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeal
The constitutionally vested jurisdiction of the courts of appeal, as
discussed earlier, is non-criminal. The basic grant to each court of appeal,
under Section 10, is appellate jurisdiction of all "civil matters decided
within its circuit.' 1 65 To avoid the problem of whether appeals in
161. LA. CONST.art. III, § 6(A) requires the representation in each house to be
"as equally as practicable on the basis of population shown by the census."
Additionally, Article I, Section 3 adopts an equal protection guarantee that furnishes a basis for judicial review of the apportionment in the legislature.
162. La. Const. art. VII, § 25 (1921). PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 16, 1973 at 88.
163. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 16, 1973 at 89 where Chairman Dennis stated: "We

intended only to speak of state courts in this article." In that same debate, Justice
Albert Tate said, "Judge Dennis, with regard to Mr. Pugh's question, did you know

that when the statute was adopted the Louisiana Bar Association had made a full
study and came to the conclusion that in every state where such a provision was
adopted it was within the constitutional powers of the legislature to provide for that
procedure?" Id.
164. La. Const. art. VII, § 10 (1921).
165. The reference to "matters" rather than "cases" is intentional, and was
adopted by the convention on the recommendation of the Committee on Style and
Drafting, JOURNAL, Jan. 9, 1974 at 8. Use of "matters" rather than "cases"
removes the implication of -the stringent case or controversy requirements often
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juvenile matters are civil or criminal, the section specifies, as the prior
constitution did, that the courts of appeal have appellate jurisdiction of all
"matters appealed from family and juvenile courts, except criminal
prosecutions of persons other than juveniles."" The grant of jurisdiction
is subject to Section 10's proviso; "Except in cases appealable to the
supreme court .

.

.,"

making it clear that those cases within the supreme

court appellate jurisdiction are not within the court of appeal jurisdiction.
However, the constitution does effect an enlargement of court of appeal
jurisdiction, for the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court has been
narrowed by Section 5.167
The grant of jurisdiction over "all civil matters" exists regardless of
the amount in controversy and regardless which lower court heard the
suit. 168 This represents an enlargement of the court of appeal jurisdiction,
associated with the term "cases." But notice that "cases" is used with reference to
supreme court appellate jurisdiction.
166. La. Const. art. VII, § 29 (1921) (as amended by La. Acts 1958, No. 561).
Appellate jurisdiction of matters from separate juvenile and family courts is clearly
covered by the language of Section 10. Also covered are matters within juvenile
court jurisdiction heard by a district court or city court, for under the long-existing
statutory scheme, the judges of district and city courts (where no separate juvenile
or family court exists) are ex officio judges of the "juvenile court." LA. R.S.
13:1561.1; 1562.1 (Supp. 1975). While not separate juvenile courts, the district
courts and city courts sitting as juvenile courts are within the appeals mentioned
under the prior law, and the new section was adopted in light of the existing
background and terminology.
Were the legislature to abolish the fiction of considering a district court or city
court a "juvenile court" and more realistically assign the juvenile jurisdiction to the
district court under special procedures, appeals of such juvenile matters ought not
to work a hange in substance in these matters; and such cases are not within
Section 5's listing of supreme court appellate jurisdiction for they do not involve
felonies, imprisonment or fines within the juvenile legislation which provides instead for adjudications of delinquency, neglect or need of supervision. LA. R.S.
13:1580 (Supp. 1975).
167. No longer within the supreme court's appellate jurisdiction are "cases in
which the constitutionality or legality of any tax, local improvement assessment,
toll or impost. . . is contested," and "appealable cases involving election contest,
but only if the election district . . . does not lie wholly within a court of appeal
circuit." La. Const. art. VII, § 10 (1921). See the text accompanying note 144,
supra.

168. Jurisdiction would lie from district court judgments on review of administrative agency determinations. Touchette v. City of Rayne Mun. Fire & Police Civil
Ser. Bd., 321 So. 2d 62 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975). There the court said "The Trosclair
decision (that the appellate court cannot hear appeals from the district court when
the district court sits as an appellate court) is no longer the law.
"Under the 1974 Constitution, even if the district court review is an appeal,
this court has jurisdiction to review that decision. Appellate jurisdiction is no longer

19771

THE JUDICIAL ARTICLE

for the prior provision did make such exceptions.169
Section 10 also qualifies the grant with the additional provision,
It is otherwise
'except as otherwise provided by this constitution .....
provided in Section 16(B) that district courts "shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by law." Since it is clear that district courts can be
granted some appellate jurisdiction by law, and since it would have been
unnecessary to include the exception clause in Section 10 if that appellate
jurisdiction were to be concurrent, it would appear implicit that the
legislature can divest the courts of appeal of the appellate jurisdiction
that it vests in district courts. This would promote efficiency, and would
be consistent with the background upon which these sections were
drafted.' 70 Of course, the legislature is free to grant no appellate jurisdiction to the district courts and to provide that all appeals from courts of
limited jurisdiction are to be heard by the courts of appeal. None of the
other appellate jurisdiction of the courts of appeal can be divested by the
legislature since the constitution does not provide for it; dollar amount
limitations on appeals from the district courts, for example, are proscribed.
But, within this "except as otherwise provided by this constitution"
proviso of Section 10 is the authority of the legislature to grant additional
jurisdiction to the courts of appeal. Authority in this regard is provided by
Section 5(E) which provides that in criminal cases not appealable to the
supreme court "a defendant has a right of appeal or review, as provided
by law." This unqualified grant of legislative power allows the legislature
to vest appellate jurisdiction in these minor criminal matters in any
court it chooses, including the courts of appeal.' 7 ' Also, Article X,
Section 12 provides for review of civil service. commission action in
disciplinary cases by courts of appeal, without prior hearing in a district

court.
based on the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the district court. This court
now has jurisdiction over all civil matters decided within its circuit ....
169. La. Const. art. VII, § 29 (1921) (as amended by La. Acts 1958, No. 561)
referred to jurisdiction over "all civil and probate matters of which the district
courts throughout the state have exclusive original jurisdiction; all civil matters
involving more than one hundred dollars, exclusive of interest, of which the district
courts throughout the state have concurrent jurisdiction."
170. La. Const. art. VII, §§ 29, 36 (1921). The First Circuit Court of Appeal has
so held in Cox v. Kiefer, 311 So. 2d 596 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).. Where the district
court had appellate jurisdiction by trial de novo from a city court judgment, "It is
evident from the above that this court is without jurisdiction in this matter." Id. at
597.
171. See the text accompanying note 27, supra.
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In addition to the appellate jurisdiction just discussed, the courts of
appeal also have discretionary jurisdiction in that Section 10(B) grants
them "supervisory jurisdiction over cases in which an appeal would lie to
it." This language was not meant to limit the provisions of the prior law
in regard to this extraordinary writ jurisdiction; 172 as the chairman of the
judiciary committee explained to the convention, "a particular ruling
would not have to be appealable but it would have to occur in a case that
would be ultimately appealable to the court of appeal. This represents no
73
change. "1
Appellate Review of Facts;Reversal of Lower Courts
The Judiciary Committee did not seriously consider abolishing appellate review of facts in civil cases, 174 and the convention overwhelmingly agreed to provide for such review in the constitution. An attempt to
abolish review of facts was defeated by a vote of 18-96; 175 and such
76
review is continued both for the supreme court and the courts of appeal. 1
This review has traditionally encompassed facts determined by a
judge or by a jury, and the tradition is continued. 177 In fact, the constitution recognizes no right to a jury trial in civil cases, 178 except for the
limited provision of Article I, Section 4 that in expropriation cases, either
party has a right to demand a jury trial to determine the amount of
compensation due.179 Since Article I, Section 4 makes no contrary provi172.

La. Const. art. VII, § 29 (1921).

173.

PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 16, 1973 at 78.

174. The Judiciary Committee voted without objection to continue appellate
review of facts. MINUTES Apr. 14, 1973 at 4.
175. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 15, 1973 at 61-70. The committee on Bill of Rights and

Elections proposed abolishing review of facts, but its efforts in this regard were
defeated. See Committee Proposal25, § 8, in JOURNAL, July 6, 1973 at 3; JOURNAL,
Sept. 5, 1973 at 4-6; PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 14, 1973 at 32, 44.
176. LA. CONST. art. V,' §§ 5(c) and 10(B). See La. Const. art. VII, §§ 10, 29
(1921).
177.

See Robertson, The Precedent Value of Conclusions of Fact in Civil Cases

in England and Louisiana, 29 LA. L. REV. 78 (1968).
178. See Carter v. City of New Orleans, 327 So. 2d 488 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976),
upholding against constitutional attack LA. R.S. 13:5105 (Supp. 1975) which provides that suits against state agencies and political subdivisions are not to be tried
by jury. The majority is correct in determining that the constitution grants no right
to a jury trial. There is some merit, however, to the dissent that a statutory scheme
which allows jury trials against private defendants but not against state agencies
violates equal protection under Article 1, Section 3.
179. Hargrave, supra note 120, at 14. Jenkins, The Declaration of Rights, 21

Loy. L. REV. 9, 23 (1975).
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sion with regard to appellate review, it follows that the general provisions
in Article V establishing appellate review of fact apply and allow review
of jury awards of compensation.180
Section 5(C) specifies that "the jurisdiction of the supreme court in
civil cases extends to both law and facts," but the section also provides
that this jurisdiction is granted "except as otherwise provided by this
constitution." But the constitution as adopted does not provide otherwise;
the exception provision is largely a remnant that was initially
inserted by the committee in case other articles of the document might

have made exceptions. As it stands, however, it is an indication that
exceptions to the court's appellate review must be provided in the constitution and cannot be established by law.
However, Section 10(B), in establishing the power to review facts
by the courts of appeal, qualifies the grant by the language, " [e]xcept as
limited to questions of law by this constitution, or as provided by law in
the review of administrative agency determinations." This of course
allows the legislature to limit court of appeal review of facts found by
administrative agencies. It is somewhat anomalous that the legislature is
granted the power to thus limit review by the courts of appeal, but not the
power to limit review by the supreme court of the same class of cases. An
attempt to eliminate the anomaly by deleting the legislative authority with
respect to the courts of appeal was defeated.' 8 1 Also defeated was an
180. The author of the expropriation provisions has suggested that jury awards
of compensation are not subject to appellate review. Jenkins, supra note 179, at 23.
He says, "Moreover, the committee did not intend the finding of facts in such jury
trials to be reviewed by the courts, because the right to trial by jury in this instance
is established by the constitution, instead of by the statutes, as is the case in other
civil jury trials. In fact, the purpose of permitting jury trials was to encourage more
substantial awards by placing the authority to decide compensation in the hands of a
jury of 'neutral' average citizens instead of in the hands of a judge, who is an
instrumentality of government paid by the state and the local police jury, either of
which may be a party to the suit."
Granted, as Jenkins suggests, the intent of the committee was not to have
appellate review of facts. In fact, the committee on Bill of Rights and Elections
intended to have no appellate review of facts at all, and it proposed a section to so
provide. See note 1, supra. But the committee's proposal and its intent were not
accepted by the convention, which refused to abolish appellate review of facts and
instead constitutionalized the institution so as not even to allow the legislature to
determine the matter. The convention so decided on two occasions, once in considering the judiciary article and once again when considering the bill of rights. The
intent of the committee on Bill of Rights and Elections must give way to the intent
of the convention. And that intent is clear in Article VII, Sections 5 and 10 which
provide for appellate review of facts without making exceptions for jury trials in
expropriation cases.
181. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 16, 1973 at 56-68.
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amendment to provide that decisions of administrative agencies are not
subject to revision if supported by competent evidence.' 82 Since this grant
of appellate review of fact is made subject only to the exceptions provided
in the constitution or by law with respect to administrative agency
determinations, it follows that the legislature cannot establish other exceptions to the grant of such review.
The constitution establishes no procedural limitations on the manner
the supreme court exercises its power to review facts in civil cases.
However, when the convention later considered the courts of appeal,
further attempts were made on the convention floor to abolish review of
facts by those courts. Those amendments were defeated, but a compromise amendment was adopted to limit the manner in which the courts of
appeal exercise this power.' 3 The language of that amendment, however,
goes further than governing review of facts and requires, in Section
8(B), a special reargument "when a judgment of a district court is to be
modified or reversed and one judge dissents." This reargument is required
whether the district court judgment is to be modified or reversed
on a question of law or a question of fact. In such reversals or modifications when one judge dissents, "the case shall be reargued before a panel
of at least five judges prior to rendition of judgment, and a majority must
concur to render judgment."
The required reargument is not the normal rehearing; an attempt to
change the provision by substituting a rehearing en banc if requested was
rejected. 184 What is required is an automatic reargument "prior to rendition of judgment.' ' 8 5 By its terms, reargument is not required if a district
court judgment is sustained, even if one judge dissents. 186 The provision
also by its terms does not apply to cases coming from other than a district
court. It does not apply if a judgment of a district court is not modified or
reversed, as in instances in which the court dismisses an appeal for failure
to conform to the requirements of appellate procedure. The provision
182. Id. at 83-87.
183. See id. at 56-68.
184. Id. at 68.
185. Id.at 57: Delegate Roy, explaining his proposal, said: "[T]hen if there is
one dissent of the three who says it should not be done, that you should not reverse
this district judge, at that time instead of rendering the opinion, the parties are
entitled to a reargument before at least five judges of that appellate court."
186. In Brown v. Employers Comm. Union Ins. Co., 316 So. 2d 194 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1975), the court reasoned that no reargument was necessary when the court
of appeal affirmed with one dissent the lower court finding of liability and lowered
the damage award without dissent.
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does not require reargument before the entire court of appeal; what is
required is a panel of at least five judges.
Though the reargument procedure could be applied by courts of
appeal With a normal complement of three or four judges through special
assignment by the supreme court of judges from other courts, the practical
effect is to require at least five judges on a court of appeal.
Another anomaly results if a court of appeal should not sit in panels,
but as a whole court, as is allowed by the constitution.187 If all the five or
more judges on a court initially heard a case, and one judge dissents from
a modification or reversal of a district court, Section 8(B) by its terms
would require reargument before those same judges. But after reargument,
a majority vote is sufficient for judgment, and the whole procedure
would seem to be a hollow exercise. When this possibility was posed to
the author of the reargument proposal, he suggested creation of a fiction
to avoid the reargument: "because not everything can be worked out
perfectly, you would have the reargument which does not mean that you
are entitled to reargue the case.88The court simply considers it reargued
1
and then renders its decision.'
The convention rejected an amendment to require the reargument
before five elected judges, apparently to exclude judges sitting by assignment. 1 89 The 7-105 vote defeating the amendment is an indication of
acceptance of the underlying principle that all judges assigned to a court
by the supreme court under its Section 5 authority possess all powers of
judges normally sitting on that court.
Jurisdiction of District Courts and Courts of Limited Jurisdiction
The district courts continue to be the basic courts of original jurisdiction. 19 Section 16 provides, "Except as otherwise authorized by this
constitution, a district court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil and
criminal matters." In view of the language used, "all civil and criminal
matters," the jurisdiction is not confined to cases involving state laws or
to disputes involving a certain monetary threshold. It is a broad grant of
jurisdiction over all matters, consistent with the committee purpose of
allowing the legislature to convert the judicial system to a three-tiered one
in which no courts of original jurisdiction other than the district courts
187. Article V, Section 8(A) allows this since it requires "panels of at least three
judges."

188.

PROCEEDINGS,

Aug. 16, 1973 at 57.

189. Id. at 61-62.
190. See La. Const. art. VII, §§ 35, 81, 82 (1921).
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would exist. The reference to matters, rather than cases,191 accommoin the district courts which
dates ex parte, non-contradictory proceedings
192
may not technically be adversary cases.
Section 16 provides the jurisdiction of all the district courts, making
no exception for Orleans Parish, where separate criminal and civil district
courts have existed. 193 The Judiciary Committee had proposed in Section
32 to include the language: "The civil district court shall have civil
jurisdiction as provided in Section 16 of this Article and the criminal
district court shall have criminal jurisdiction as provided in Section 16 of
this Article. 1 94 The quoted language, however, was deleted by- floor
amendment, 95 and Section 32 as adopted makes no reference to the
jurisdiction of the Orleans courts. But Section 32 does continue the
existence of the separate criminal and civil district courts until merged by
law. These provisions can be reconciled by considering the Orleans.
district as being served by one district court that is by constitutional
provision continued as separate civil and criminal divisions until merged
by an act of the legislature, those divisions dividing the criminal and civil
jurisdiction conferred by Section 16.
The constitution itself lists the types of cases in which the district
courts have exclusive original jurisdiction; Section 16 enumerates
"felony cases and cases involving title to immovable property; the right
to office or other public position; civil or political rights; probate and
succession matters; the state, a political corporation, or political subdivisions, or a succession, as a defendant; and the appointment of receivers or
liquidators for corporations or partnerships.' ' 196 This approach makes it
clear that such cases cannot be included by law in the jurisdiction of
courts of limited or specialized original jurisdiction. It also follows that
matters not within this listing are not exclusive to the district courts and
that the legislature can grant courts of limited or specialized jurisdiction

concurrent jurisdiction over those matters. Such being the approach under
191. Compare the reference to "cases" in Article V, Section 5(D) which establishes the jurisdiction of the supreme court. See La. Const. art. VII, § 35 (1921)
(which distinguished between "criminal cases" and "probate and succession matters"). See note 165, supra.
192. See LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 2881-93.
193. See the text accompanying note 74, supra.
194. Committee Proposal 21, § 35, par. 2, in JOURNAL, Aug. 24, 1973 at 7.
Section 35 was renumbered as Section 32 of Article V upon final styling.
195.

PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 24, 1973 at 80, 94.

196. The listing is similar to La. Const. art. VII, § 35 (1921).
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the prior constitution, this prospect raised little controversy in the committee or on the convention floor.
However, it is less than clear whether the legislature can divest the
district court of jurisdiction over some classes of cases and vest that
jurisdiction exclusively in courts of limited or specialized jurisdiction. 97
The starting point for determining this question is Section 16, which
makes the grant of jurisdiction to the district courts, "[e]xcept as otherwise authorized by this constitution. . . ." The committee's working
draft, following the lead of the Law Institute Project, would have vested
the jurisdiction "unless otherwise provided in this constitution or by
law." 9 That approach allowed the legislature to divest the district court
of any jurisdiction the constitution did not state was exclusive in the
district court. The committee, however, did not recommend such broad
authority in the legislature, and its initial proposal would have qualified
the grant of jurisdiction with language, "[u]nless otherwise provided or
authorized in this constitution . . ."199 The later committee proposal
condensed the provision to, "[u]nless otherwise authorized by this constitution. . .. "
The final styling process resulted in the language as
adopted, "[e]xcept as otherwise authorized by this constitution ..
It is clear then, that the legislature can divest the district courts of
jurisdiction only if the constitution contains an authorization for it to do
SO.

Section 18 gives the legislature authority to grant jurisdiction to
family and juvenile courts. But does it also grant authority to divest
district courts of that jurisdiction? The language of Section 18 is: "Not
withstanding any contrary provision of Section 16 of this Article, juvenile
and family courts shall have jurisdiction as provided by law." If concurrent jurisdiction were contemplated, the "notwithstanding" clause would
have been unnecessary, for family and juvenile matters are not among
those which Section 16 lists as being exclusive to the district courts, and
the legislature would be empowered to provide for concurrent jurisdiction
over such matters. One must then conclude that if the specific reference to
Section 16 within the "notwithstanding" clause is to have effect, it must
197. Any legislative act regulating jurisdiction would have to meet the requirements of Article III, Section 12 prohibiting local or special laws "(3). . . regulating
the practice or jurisdiction of any court...." and the requirement of Article V,
Section 15(A) that parish courts have "parishwide territorial jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction which shall be uniform throughout the state."
198. Draft A, Section 21; PROJET, Article VI, Section 26.
199. Committee Proposal 6, § 16, in DOCUMENTS at 61.
200. Id. 21, § 16, in DOCUMENTS at 73.
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be to "authorize" the legislature to divest the district courts of that
jurisdiction and vest exclusively in a specialized family or juvenile
court.20 ' This conclusion is consistent with the then-existingbackground
of the prior constitutional and statutory provisions which did provide for
20 2
such exclusive jurisdiction in the separate juvenile and family courts,
and the documents of the constitution do not establish a record indicating
a purpose of changing the situation. It is also consistent with the unique
strong language of the "notwithstanding" clause of Section 18; the
normal exception clauses are more general.
More troublesome is the relationship of city court, mayor's court and
justice of the peace jurisdiction in relation to that of the district court.
While Sections 15 and 32 continue the city courts, those sections refer to
continuation of the existence of those courts and do not address themselves
to their jurisdiction. Of course, under the general principle that the
legislature can enact any legislation not constitutionally prohibited, it can
grant those courts jurisdiction over any matters not enumerated within
Section 16 as being exclusive to the district courts.
But, can the legislature divest the district courts of that jurisdiction it
grants those courts of limited jurisdiction? Again, the basic reference is
Section 16 and the question is whether the legislature is "authorized by
this constitution" to divest the district courts of that jurisdiction. It seems
that the constitution contains no such authorization. Even the power to
grant those courts jurisdiction is not "authorized by this constitution,"
but is authorized by virtue of the general principle that it can be done
since it is not prohibited. It is an even further step to find "authorization"
to divest the district court of jurisdiction. Also, neither Sections 15, 20 or
32 contains strong language paralleling Section 18's reference to juvenile
and family court jurisdiction with the "notwithstanding Section 16"
formula. Attempting to fashion an implied authorization to withdraw
jurisdiction from the district court in these matters which the limited
jurisdiction courts are granted is difficult, especially since the background 203 on which the committee and convention worked was one in
201. It is, of course, truethat no new family or juvenile courts can be established, but Section 18 does apply to those specialized courts in existence on the
effective date of the constitution. See the text following note 86, supra.
202. For example, La. Const. art. VII, § 53 (1921) granted the Family Court of
East Baton Rouge "exclusive original jurisdiction in the following proceedings
203. See LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 4831-34. The analysis pursued in the text would
remove from the Orleans city courts their exclusive original jurisdiction in matters
involving $100 or less. See LA. CODE CiV. P. art. 4835; La. Const. art. VII, §§ 91,92
(1921).
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which concurrent jurisdiction with the district court was the rule, rather
than exclusive jurisdiction in those courts.
A similar problem exists with respect to the new parish courts which
the legislature may establish by virtue of Section 15, courts "of limited
jurisdiction which shall be uniform throughout the state." Committee and
convention policy in this regard was to allow the legislature to move
toward a uniform four-tiered judicial system throughout the state with the
parish court being the court of limited jurisdiction. Section 15 "authorizes" the legislature to establish the jurisdiction of those courts by its
mention of "subject matter jurisdiction which shall be uniform throughout
the state." But again, in terms of divesting the district court of the
jurisdiction granted the parish courts, is this within the provision of
Section 16, "[e]xcept as otherwise authorized by this constitution
."? Section 14 is an authorization; but is it an authorization to divest?
The language here is not as strong as the "notwithstanding" clause of
Section 18 for juvenile and family courts. But it is certainly more of an
"authorization" than the language used with respect to city courts.
At this point, one could drop back to the notions that the convention
was operating on a background of existing law and reflecting those
assumptions when not being otherwise explicit. But while the existing
background of city courts was one of concurrent jurisdiction, the parish
courts are a new institution without that supporting background. On the
other hand, judicial efficiency might militate against concurrent jurisdiction. It is also possible that the fact that the convention purpose of
allowing a new, uniform, four-tiered judicial system with a revitalized
parish court staffed by full-time judges who cannot practice law is
consistent with giving them exclusive jurisdiction in some matters.
In any event, with regard to the parish courts, the convention record
does not impel a decision either way. It again may be a case where the
ultimate decision will be based largely on considerations of judicial
efficiency and notions of whether litigants should be given a choice of
forum.
Finally, Section 16(B) makes clear that a district court "shall have
appellate jurisdiction as provided by law," with the legislature deciding
whether this is to be by trial de novo or by reviewing the record from the
2
court below. 04

204. See LA. R.S. 13:1896 (Supp. 1974) governing appeals from mayor's and
justice of the peace courts and providing for trial de novo in the district court.
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JUDGES

Selection
Section 22 requires that all judges be elected, making exception only
for the temporary filling of vacancies by appointment. These elections
continue to be held at the time of the regular congressional elections,
separating the 5judicial contests from the races for the bulk of local and
20
state offices.
The Judiciary Committee did hear a great deal of testimony from
proponents of merit selection of judges, including that of the executive
director of the American Judicature Society and several prominent attorneys. 2°6 The committee had before it the Law Institute Project recommending merit selection rather than election. 20 7 It was also aware of the
close vote favoring merit selection in a poll of members of the Louisiana
Bar Association, a poll which disclosed strong sentiment for merit selection in Orleans Parish. However, of the 34 judicial districts from which
responses were received, only 4 districts favored merit selection. 20 8 On
the other hand, Chief Justice Joe W. Sanders and former Chief Justice
John B. Fournet, among others, advocated election of judges,209 Chief
Justice Sanders telling the committee the Missouri plan "in my opinion,
does not eliminate politics in judicial selection but narrows it to a small
group. "210
Though the committee spent much time hearing testimony on the
issue, the result in favor of election was a foregone conclusion. The basic
populist orientation of the convention tended toward a greater voice for
the people and a resistance to gubernatorial or small group power. A
convention that resisted reducing the number of state-wide elected officials 211 and that was intent on shortening the terms of appellate judges
was not likely to abolish election of judges. In any event, the political
forces were such that the merit selection concept had no chance. The
committee recommended election by unanimous vote. 212 It did not accept
205. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 18, 1973 at 24.
206. Baton Rouge State Times, April 20, 1973 at 10-B, col. 3; id., April 14, 1973,
at I-A, col. 5.
207. PROJET, Article VI, Section 43 (1954).

208.

Baton Rouge State Times, August 6, 1973, at 9-A, col. 1.
Id., March 23, 1973 at 1-A, col. 5; March 9, 1973, at I-B, col. 1.
Id., March 23, 1973 at 1-A, col. 5.
211. See generally LA. CONST. art. IV, § 20 (Executive Branch); PROCEEDINGS,
Aug. 23, 1973 at 3-53.
212. MINUTES, Apr. 20, 1973 at 3. Baton Rouge State Times, April 21, 1973, at
I-A, col. 2.
209.
210.
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the provisions of its working draft 213 requiring non-partisan elections
without party primaries and without placing party designations on the
214
ballot, as had been suggested by Chief Justice Sanders.
The convention was of a similar mind. A floor amendment that did
not require, but simply authorized, the legislature to adopt a merit
selection plan was overwhelmingly defeated by a vote of 26-87.215 In
fact, though election of judges was implicit in the committee proposal,
the convention adopted without objection a floor amendment making the
requirement explicit by stating "all judges shall be elected." '2 16 The
delegates also defeated, but by a close 57-58 vote, a floor amendment
217
requiring that judicial elections be conducted on a non-partisan basis.
The language of Section 22 simply requires election, without stating
specific rules as to type, thus allowing the action of the 1975 legislature in
providing for election of state officials, including judges, without party
primary nominations. 218 Though party designations will appear on the
ballot under this law, the result is quite close to the non-partisan election
proposal rejected by the convention.
Vacancies;New Judgeships
The convention strengthened the institution of an elected judiciary in
its provisions for filling vacancies and newly created judgeships. Though
Louisiana has traditionally provided for election of judges, a substantial
number of judges first reached the bench by gubernatorial appointment
filling a vacancy or a new judgeship. 219 With an incumbent's advantage,
the appointee was likely to be elected in the ensuing election, if opposed
at all. Often the selection system operated as a bastardized Missouri
plan-appointment by a political officer with subsequent confirmation
elections. One delegate, in fact, estimated that sixty percent of the sitting
213. Draft A, Section 30 provided in part c: "The election of judges shall be by
ballot separate from the party contests for other offices. The candidates for election
as judge shall be nominated by nominating papers signed by at least one hundred

qualified electors of the election district and filed with the secretary of state. ...
The candidates for each judicial office shall be placed in alphabetical order without
reference to party affiliation or any individual designation."
214. Baton Rouge State Times, March 23, 1973, at 1-A, col. 5.
215. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 18, 1973 at 58-72.
216. Id. at 23-24.
217. Id. at 4-15. See also id. at 24-29.
218. LA: R.S. 18:384-423 (Supp. 1975); id. 18:841-63 (Supp. 1975).
219. See La. Const. art. VII, §§ 7, 21, 33, 53, 69, 80, 82, 90, 92, 94, 97 (1921).
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judges were initially appointed by the governor. 220 The new constitution
terminates the prior practice.
Under Section 22, a newly-created judgeship or a vacancy is filled
by appointment by the supreme court until a special election is held. The
appointee, who need not be a judge, must meet the qualifications of the
office other than domicile, and serves at the court's pleasure. 22' Not only
is the governor's power of appointment ended, but to abolish the advantage the appointee might have in an election to fill the vacancy, it is
provided that the appointee is ineligible as a candidate at the election to
fill the vacancy or the newly created judgeship.222
Little opposition developed to the committee's proposal 223 to remove
the power of the governor to make these appointments and the
delegates who were allies of Governor Edwin Edwards made no strong
effort to oppose the change. The attempt to continue the old system was
sponsored by black convention delegates and was cast in terms of being a
mechanism to obtain more black judges. Supporters stated that minority
group members would be unlikely to be elected as judges, but that some
blacks could and would be appointed by governors to vacant or new
225
judgeships. 224 The amendment to continue the old practice was rejected.
In any event, the appointment is temporary, for the vacancy or the
new judgeship must be filled by an election held within six months of the
226
day the vacancy occurs or the judgeship is established.
In case of vacancy, the person elected fills that vacancy, i.e.,
220.

Representative R. Harmon Drew, PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 18, 1973 at 31. See

also id. at 39.
221. See id. at 33. The appointee need not be a judge, for Article V, Section
22(B) refers to "a person meeting the qualifications ..
" (Emphasis added).
222. To the argument sometimes made that this disability runs counter to some
type of right to run for office under federal due process or equal protection
provisions, the answer is simply (1) a person voluntarily assumes the disability by
accepting the appointment and (2) the disqualification is supported by the rational
basis that it promotes a judicial selection process free of the influences of incumbent judges and politicians.
223. Committee Proposal21, § 22, in JOURNAL, Aug. 18, 1973 at 2; id. 6, § 24, in
JOURNAL, July 6, 1973 at 16.

224. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 18, 1973 at 37-39.
225. Id. at 50. See also id. at 29-32.
226. An amendment to provide for the election at the next regularly scheduled
congressional or statewide election was defeated. Supporters of the amendment
suggested that their alternative would save election costs by providing for fewer
special elections. The opposition argued about the need to fill the vacancy as
quickly as possible. The amendment failed by a vote of 47-70. Id. at 33-36. See also
MINUTES, June 1, 1973 at 5.
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completes the existing term of office, rather than commencing a full term
of his own. Section 22 provides that "a vacancy in the office of a judge
shall be filled. . .

."

using "filling a vacancy" in the technical sense of

completing the existing term. Similar language is used in the Executive
Article 227 with the same meaning, and was used in the predecessor
provisions with that same meaning. 228 It would be inconsistent with the
requirement that election of judges be at the congressional election to
allow the judge elected to fill a vacancy to serve a full term; a full term
could end so as to require election of the successor in a non-congressionalelection year. If the section, which applies to all judges,
allowed full terms, it would destroy the plan of staggered elections for the
229
supreme court and courts of appeal.
In the case of a new judgeship, the initial term can be established by
law, and can be less than the normal full term. The provision for the new
judgeships was drafted in a background of the prior law where such was
not only possible but required. 23° And, as discussed in filling vacancies,
granting a full term for all new judgeships could conflict with the
requirement of having judicial elections at the congressional election in
the same year the term ends. Full terms could also defeat the system of
staggering of terms of supreme court and court of appeal judgeships and
the scheme of having district judges of a court all elected at the same
election.
227. Article IV, Section 14 regulating the order of succession to the governorship clearly states: "The successor shall serve the remainder of the term for which
the governor was elected." But Sections 15 and 16, governing other vacancies, are
not so specific even though those other vacancies are not filled for new terms, but
rather to complete existing terms. Section 16 speaks of a "vacancy being filled."
Article III, Section 4(D) illustrates the use of this formula with respect to completing an existing term; there the language is more explicit: "A vacancy in the
legislature shall be filled for the remainder of the term ....
"
228. La. Const. art. VII, § 7 (1921): A supreme court "vacancy shall be filled"
by special election. No precise statement was made regarding length of term, but
the practice was to fill the remainder of the term to continue the system of staggered
terms. Section 23 provided that court of appeal vacancies were filled by election
"for the remainder of the term." Section 69(C), with respect to district judges,
referred to elections "to fill the vacancy" and the tradition was to complete the
existing term rather than to start a new term.
229. New court of appeal judgeships established by LA. R.S. 13:312.2 (Supp.
1975) were not full terms. See the text at note 23, supra.
230. La. Const. art. VII, § 21(F) (1921): Court of appeal judges' terms were
fixed to produce staggered terms. Section 33: New district court judges had initial
terms "which shall not extend beyond that of the other District Judges' term in
office."
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Qualifications
Section 24 establishes uniform qualifications for judges of the main
components of the judicial system (supreme court, court of appeal,
district court, parish court, family and juvenile court) and prevents those
judges from practicing law. The section does not apply to city court
judges, who were deliberately omitted from the listing. 23' Though a
number of committee members thought it desirable that city court judges
be full-time and not engage in law practice, such a provision might have
had a drastic effect on the smaller city courts. It is also the expectation
that city courts will be phased out and either incorporated into district
courts or changed into parish courts; this movement would result in courts
whose judges must not practice law. It is left to the legislature to establish
qualifications for city court judges, and since nothing prevents it from
doing so, the legislature can provide that such judges shall not practice
law.
The qualifications of Section 24 are exclusive and the legislature
cannot add to them. 232 The minimum age requirements of the prior law
are deleted; the experience requirement is reduced to five years, applies
to all judges, and is stated in terms of having been "admitted to the
practice of law in this state" rather than the prior reference to "shall have
practiced law in the State. "233 The final qualification is that of having
been domiciled "in the respective district, circuit, or parish for the two
years preceding election."
The word choice in Section 24, "five years prior to his election"
and "two years preceding election" makes clear that the time periods are
counted from the date a person is or would be elected to the office, the
date of the final election in the electoral process. The language is distinguishable from that used in Article II, Section 4(A) which establishes
qualifications for legislators in terms of "at the time of qualification" for
the office and Article IV, Section 5 which establishes qualifications for
statewide elected officers in terms of "the date of his qualification as a
candidate."
231.

PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 22, 1973 at 40-42.

232. Cf. LA. CONST. art. V, § 33. When stated qualifications for jurors were not
meant to be exclusive, the power of the legislature to add them was specifically
mentioned. ("The legislature may provide additional qualifications.") Such language was not incorporated in Section 24, indicating that the section is exclusive.
233. La. Const. art. VII, § 6 (1921). See also id. art. VII, §§ 22, 33, 51(A) and 75.
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The practical reason for this difference in the date qualifications is
that the initial proposals for these sections came from different committees
which did not make their provisions uniform. That the word choice
was intentional is clear, however. This is most apparent in Article IV,
Section 5, which in addition to the language quoted above, continues with
an additional qualification for the attorney general, a judicial officer, that
he be admitted to the practice of law in the state "for at least five years
preceding his election. "234
A floor amendment to delete the two-year domicile requirement
failed to pass, though it did present the problem of applying the requirement when circuits or districts are changed. 235 That problem was not
resolved in convention consideration of Section 24. However, it ought to
be resolved by construing the section in light of Article III, Section 4,
which addresses that problem with respect to legislative districts. 236
There, at the election following redistricting, an elector may qualify as a
candidate from any district created in whole or in part from his prior
district. If his domicile is not then in the new district from which elected,
he must change his domicile to that district by the time he is sworn into
office. This provision is the convention's best statement on the matter,
and produces a result which promotes the policy of having as many
qualified people as possible run for office.
Term
The Judiciary Committee proposed retaining 14-year terms for
judges of the supreme court and 12-year terms for judges of the courts of
appeal. 2 37 Though it had rejected proposals to shorten supreme court
234. The convention did not concur with an attempt by the Committee on Style
and Drafting to make these requirements uniform by amending Sections 24 and 26
to refer to the time of qualification. The amendment to make the change was ruled
out of order; the convention refused to suspend the rules to allow consideration; the
amendment was withdrawn from the files of the convention. JOURNAL, Jan. 9, 1974
at 11.
235. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 22, 1973 at 68-75.
236. Debate on the amendment by Delegate Robert G. Pugh centered on the fact
that his amendment abolished the two-year requirement altogether, and was opposed mostly because of that fact. The amendment was not phrased in terms of
simply solving the problems of changes in circuits, districts or parishes as in Article
III, Section 4. Defeat of the amendment was not a rejection of an Article III,
Section 4 solution to the problem, bgt a rejection of the notion that there be no
residency requirement at all. In fact, the debate on the amendment indicates that
some delegates had Article III, Section 4 in mind. See especially id. at 73.
237. Committee Proposal 21, §§ 3, 8, in JOURNAL, Aug. 15, 1973 at 3 and Aug.
16, 1973 at 4; Committee Proposal 6, §§ 3, 8, in JOURNAL, July 6, 1973 at 15. The
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terms to 8, 10 and then 12 years, the fact that a committee generally
favorable to the judiciary rejected the 12-year term proposal only by a 6-8
238
vote presaged the convention action in reducing those terms.
A number of convention delegates introduced amendments to reduce
the supreme court terms to 8, 9, 10 and 12 years.239 After a "Henry
Huddle," 24 those delegates chose to proceed with the ten-year-term
amendment, and it was adopted by a 59-52 vote. 24 1 Advocates of the
longer term spoke of the importance of independence of judges and the
need to keep them from too much intrusion into politics. Proponents of
the shorter term reflected basic populist sentiment that judges should be
more responsive to "their people." One delegate said:
I take exception with Judge Dennis when he says that
judges should not be political. I feel that it is not a method of
politics but it is being in touch with the people. . . . I think that
he should be in touch with the people and in line with their

beliefs. 242
Another typical sentiment had been expressed earlier in committee:
"What we want is a more independent judiciary, but not a more arrogant
one. My experience is that the more independent they are, the more
arrogant they are. "243 These sentiments carried the day and supreme
court terms were reduced from 14 to 10 years.
This done, it was inevitable that court of appeal terms would be
shortened; the only question was how much. The convention quickly
adopted an amendment reducing the 12-year terms to 10 years 244 by a
large 78-39 majority. Just as quickly, it defeated a later amendment to
245
reduce the term to 8 years.
constitutional provisions for supreme court terms are in Article V, Section 3. Those
for court of appeal judges are in Section 8.
238. MINUTES, Apr. 20, 1973 at 4. Baton Rouge State Times, April 21, 1973, at
I-A, col. 2.
239. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 15, 1973 at 14.
240. When a large number of similar amendments were proposed, Convention
Chairman E.L. Henry often called for an informal meeting of the sponsors so they
could perhaps compromise their proposals or agree on an order for presenting the
amendments. These huddles often resulted in reducing the number of amendments
and saving time.
241. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 15, 1973 at 26.
242. Id. at 25.
243. Baton Rouge State Times, April 23, 1973, at II-A, col. 1.
244. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 16, 1973 at 53.
245. Id. at 55.
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Section 22(C) provides that a judge serving on the effective date of
the constitution whose term does not end in the year of a regular congressional election shall continue to serve through December 31 of the
following year. The purpose of the provision is to remove an anomaly
under the prior law 246 under which the term of a court of appeal judge
would end in an odd-numbered year, but the election for the subsequent
term would be held at the congressional election of the preceding year.
This could lead to a defeated judge continuing to serve for more than a
year past his defeat, and the newly elected judge not taking office for
more than a year after his election.247 Section 22(C) changes this and has
the term of a court of appeal judge end on December 31 of the year in
which the congressional election occurs; in doing so, it extends the term
of court of appeal judges serving on the effective date of the constitution
by one year.
A major political battle developed in the Judiciary Committee over
retaining the prior constitutional provisions which established 12-year
terms for Orleans district judges while district judges in the remainder of
the state had 6-year terms. 248 Early in its deliberations, the committee
proposed continuing 12-year terms for Orleans district judges by adopting
a general provision that district judges in districts with more than 300,000
population would serve 12-year terms.249 That provision would have
included judges in Jefferson Parish and would soon thereafter have
encompassed East Baton Rouge. The provision was later rejected by the
committee,250 as was an attempt to provide 12-year terms for all district
judges in the state. 25' Eventually, the committee compromised on a
provision that maintained the status quo, but allowed reduction of the
Orleans terms to six years if approved by the legislature and by the voters
of Orleans Parish. 25 2 During this process, several Orleans judges appeared
246. La. Const. art. IV, §§ 19, 21 (1921).
247. See Draft A, Section 30(D) and comments; Kopfler v. Edwards, 318 So. 2d
653, 659 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).

248. La. Const. art. VII, §§ 33, 80, 82 (1921).
249.

MINUTES,

Apr. 21, 1973 at 4, 5. Baton Rouge State Times, April 23, 1973, at

I -A, col. 1; Baton Rouge Sunday Advocate, April 22, 1973, at 10-A, col. 1.
250. Baton Rouge Sunday Advocate, June 17, 1973, at 3-B, col. 3; Baton Rouge
State Times, July 19, 1973, at 8-C, col. 1; July 18, 1973, at 8-C, col. 1; June 18, 1973,
at 18-A, col. 5.
251. MINUTES, June 16, 1973 at 4. Baton Rouge Sunday Advocate, June 17,
1973, at 3-B, col. 3.
252. MINUTES, June 16, 1973 at 7, 8. Committee Proposal 21, § 15(C), in JouRnal, Aug. 17, 1973 at 1; Committee Proposal6, § 15(B), in JOURNAL, July 6, 1973 at
16.
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before the committee, arguing that shorter terms would increase
political pressure on the judges and pointing out that the cost of campaigning for an Orleans judgeship is so high that requiring one to run
every six years was akin to "sentencing a man to bankruptcy."253 It was
argued that Jefferson Parish judges, facing similar conditions as those in
Orleans, should also have 12-year terms. 254 Supporters of the longer
terms for Orleans judges were not able to muster stronger arguments for
the differential in terms and by the time the convention considered district
judge terms, the prospect of Orleans district judges keeping terms longer
than those of appellate judges was negligible. In fact, the amendment to
provide uniform six-year terms for all district judges had more co-sponsors
than the number for votes required for passage. After a pro
255
forma debate, the amendment passed by an overwhelming 96-20 vote.
Thereafter, amendments were adopted to provide six-year terms for
257
parish court judges 256 and city court judges.
Section 15(C) as finally adopted reads: "The term of a district, a
parish, or city court judge shall be six years." The constitution does not
establish the term for judges of juvenile and family courts, thus leaving
the legislature free to do so. 258 Legislation has continued the existing
terms for those judges, 25 9 leaving the judges of the Orleans juvenile court
with terms of 8 years, making them the longest-tenured of the judges of
courts of original jurisdiction. This disparity was not the result of any
articulated committee policy. Rather, the committee had proposed fixing
in the constitution only the terms of district court judges, and leaving the
legislature free to establish the terms for the judges of other courts of
limited and specialized jurisdiction. It was then by floor amendment that
253. Baton Rouge State Times, July 18, 1973, at 8-C, col. 1.
254. Id., July 19, 1973, at 8-C, col. 1.
255. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 17, 1973 at 57-60. See LA. CONST. art. V, § 15(C). The
proposal had 74 co-authors. The lead author was Delegate J. Burton Willis who was

a member of the Judiciary Committee.
256. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 17, 1973 at 6-62.
257. Id., Aug. 28, 1973 at 38-40. Under the prior provisions, city court judges of
the First City Court of Orleans had eight-year terms (La. Const. art. VII, § 90
(1921)); judges of the Second City Court of Orleans had four-year terms (id. art.
VII, § 92 (1921)); judges of the Baton Rouge City Court had four-year terms; and
other judges had six-year terms (id. art. VII, § 51 (1921)). The new provision
established uniform six-year terms.
258. A similar situation exists with respect to the judges of the municipal and
traffic court judges in Orleans.
259. The prior constitutional provisions relative to the terms of these judges
were continued as statutes by LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 16.
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six-year terms were established for parish and city court judges, and in
the quickness of the moment, no floor amendments were introduced with
respect to the judges of other limited jurisdiction courts.
The reductions in term are inapplicable to terms of judges who were
elected prior to the effective date of the new constitution.2 60 In Article
XIV, Section 35 established the effective date of the constitution as
"twelve o'clock midnight on December 31, 1974," and Section 26
states, "this constitution shall not be retroactive and shall not create any
right or liability which did not exist under the Constitution of 1921 based
upon actions or matters occurring prior to the effective date of this
constitution." By virtue of these provisions, a judge who was elected
prior to January 1, 1975 was elected to the longer term and not to the
reduced term. This is also made clear in the Judiciary Article, where
Article V, Section 21 provides: "The term of office . . . of a judge shall
not be decreased during the term for which he is elected." The emphasis
here is on the term for which elected, that term being the term under the
old constitution, and for which he ran and was elected to while the old
261
constitution was still in effect.
Protection of Judges
Section 21 provides, "The term of office, retirement benefits, and
compensation of a judge shall not be decreased during the term for which
he is elected."

262

Deleted is the provision of the prior law that a judge's jurisdiction as
260. See PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 15, 1973 at 25.
261. In all respects, the legislature which convoked the convention and the
convention itself were quite solicitious of preserving the rights of existing office
holders. See LA. CONST. arts. IV, § 20; XIV, §§ 1-4, 15; La. Acts 1972, No. 2. See
also the predecessor provision, which uses similar language with emphasis on
election, La. Const. art. VII, § 40 (1921).
The apparently odd word choice in LA. CONST. art. V,§ 21, "term for which he
is elected," seems to put an emphasis on election, as the predecessor language did.
La. Const. art. VII, § 40 (1921). Contrast the similar provisions of LA. CONST. art.
V, § 31, which refers to the "term of office" in establishing the protection of other
officials whose length of term was not changed. In Section 31, where there was no
problem with the constitution reducing terms, there is no addressing of the problem
and no use of the reference to election. In Section 21, where the problem did exist,
the reference emphasizes election, fortifying the implication that the protection of
length of term vested upon election, rather than at the time of taking office.
262. Committee Proposal 21, § 21, in JOURNAL, Aug. 17, 1973 at 10, and Committee Proposal 6, § 23, in JOURNAL, July 6, 1973 at 16 did not include the reference
to retirement benefits.
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to amount could not be affected; 263 continuing the prior provision would
have hampered the policy of Section 15(A) allowing changes in and
abolition of courts of limited and specialized jurisdiction. Article III,
Section 12, however, does prohibit local and special laws "regulating the
practice or jurisdiction of any court"; this requirement of uniformity
prohibits changes in jurisdictional amount as a means of penalizing or
pressuring a single judge. Section 15(B) also requires that the jurisdiction
of parish courts be uniform throughout the state.
While the prior law stated that these matters could not be "affected
in his term," Section 21 refers to term or compensation not being
"decreased during the term" to reflect current jurisprudence allowing
264
salary increases for judges.
The committee proposal did not establish the terms of parish and city
court judges, allowing the legislature to do so. At that stage, the prohibition against decreases in term "during the term for which he is elected"
served to restrain the legislature in regard to them. However, by floor
amendments, the convention constitutionally established six-year terms
for parish and city court judges which the legislature cannot change.265
The prohibition against change of term is not completely superfluous,
however. It protects family and juvenile court judges, and traffic and
municipal court judges. It also evidences the intent of the convention,
which itself reduced the terms of some judges, not to apply that reduction
to judges who were elected while the prior constitution was in effect.
Constititutional establishment of a retirement system for judges
became the most visible and voluble political issue in the floor debate on
the judiciary article. The prior constitution did provide such a system,2 66
a system that required no contribution by judges, but which normally
provided no benefits unless a judge had served 20 years and which was
deficient in other respects in light of modern pension systems. The
committee proposed a new system that required contribution and estab263. La. Const. art. VII, § 40 (1921). See Draft A, Section 29, Comments: "The

source article also prevented change in the territorial jurisdiction, reacting in 1940
against the gerrymandering of Judge Pavy out of office in 1935. Continuation of this
limitation is not recommended, since the isolated instance does not justify the
rigidity for the future, it would hamper the consolidation of the statutory courts
and, for instance, the creation of parish courts which include the city courts within
the parish as diisons."
264. Drew v. Parker, 249 So. 2d 356 (La.,App. 1st Cir. 1971).
265. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 28, 1973 at 38-40; id., Aug. 17, 1973 at 61-62.
266. La. Const. art. VII, § 8 (1921).
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lished more liberal benefits.26 7 Strong opposition to the proposal developed, led by the chairman of the convention and the governor. The
position of the opponents was not based so much on dislike of the
increased benefits for judges, but on the view that retirement plans have
no place being solidified in a constitution and on the prospect that other
groups of state employees would demand similar provisions if judicial
retirement were provided for in detail in the document, leading to a
268
plethora of detail and possibly unsound retirement plans.
The crucial vote was on an amendment by Delegate Camille Gravel,
Chairman E.L. Henry and others to delete the committee proposal and
substitute a mandate to the legislature to provide for retirement of judges.
The amendment passed by a 58-57 vote. 269 Subsequent minor modifications resulted in Section 23.270 The section mandates the legislature to
enact a new retirement system for judges, a system that must grant credit
for prior service without contribution.
Once that new system is adopted, a judge taking office after the
effective date of the law enacting that system will have no choice but to
become a member of that new system. However, judges serving at that
time are given the option to join the new system or to remain covered by
the prior system. It is likely then that it will be some time before the old
system is completely phased out. And, as to those judges serving or
retired on the effective date of the constitution, their retirement benefits
"shall not be diminished, nor shall the benefits to which a surviving
spouse is entitled be reduced." As to those judges, the benefits accruing
to them under the old retirement plan cannot be reduced at all.
Section 21 contains an additional special provision that a judge's
retirement benefits (not restricted to judges serving on the effective date
of the constitution) "shall not be decreased during the term for which he
is elected." As proposed by the committee, the section did not include
this protection of retirement benefits; those matters were not subject to
any legislative control under the proposed constitutional retirement plan.
Once the convention rejected the committee's plan, the protection against
diminution of retirement benefits was added during the debate on the
proposal that became Section 31, and was later transferred to Section 21
27
on recommendation of the Committee on Style and Drafting. '
267.
1973 at
268.
269.

Committee Proposal 21, § 23, in JOURNAL, Aug. 18, 1973 at 7 and Aug. 22,
2; Committee Proposal6, § 25, in JOURNAL, July 6, 1973 at 16.
See, e.g.. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 18, 1973 at 92-107.
Id. at 107.

270.
271.

Id., Aug. 22, 1973 at 5-38.
Id., Jan. 9, 1974 at 76; id., Aug. 23, 1973 at 74-76. The vote on August 17,

1973

(PROCEEDINGS,

Aug. 17, 1973 at 109-16), rejecting at that time the amendment
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The extent of protection under Section 21 is unclear. Unlike Section
23's protection of retirement benefits of judges serving on the effective
date of the constitution from being diminished at all, Section 21 prohibits a
decrease "during the term for which he is elected." During that term, a
judge has no retirement benefits in the sense of a sum of money then
payable. After the end of the term, he may be eligible for an annuity, and a
construction of the section could be made by which this annuity could be
decreased, for the protection against decrease is only "during the term for
which he is elected." Such a construction would be totally at odds with the
policy of preventing political control of judges and would allow the most
potent political control. It would be at odds with Article X, Section 29,
which provides that membership in any retirement system of the state
"shall be a contractual relationship" and the "state shall guarantee benefits payable to a member of a state retirement system.

. .

."

Under that

provision, once some retirement rights vest, they are obligations of contract that cannot be divested.
The reference to "retirement benefits" in Section 21 must then
contemplate that what is protected is the rate of accrual of retirement
credits. Once a judge commences a term under a retirement plan that
provides some percentage accrual to be used as the basis for determining a
retirement payment, he has the right to continue to accrue credits at that
rate for the term, and the accrual rate cannot be decreased until his term is
completed. And, once these accrual credits are earned, Article X, Section
29 prevents their being divested.
Section 23 also establishes mandatory retirement for judges at age 70,
a reduction from the former mandatory retirement age of 75 .272 The
provision was part of the committee proposal, 273 and while it requires
retirement at age 70, it was pointed out to the convention that under the
supreme court authority in Section 5 to assign a sitting or retired judge to
any court, the retired judges "would still be able to be used to help out in
other courts.

....

274

to Section 21 protecting judicial retirement benefits from reduction was not a
rejection of the concept on its merits. Rather, this was an introductory skirmish to
the political battle over whether the judicial retirement system would remain in the
constitution. The debate here was directed more to the upcoming votes on the
retirement system in general than to the merits of protecting judges from possible
political control through reduction or threats of reduction of retirement benefits.
272. La. Const. art. VII, § 8 (1921).
273. Committee Proposal6, § 25, in DOCUMENTS at 62; Committee Proposal 21,
§ 23, in JOURNAL, Aug. 18, 1973 at 7, 8.
274. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 18, 1973 at 76.

1977]

THE JUDICIAL ARTICLE

As discussed earlier, the committee proposal also provided in the
same section a constitutional retirement system for judges; when the
convention rejected that proposal and adopted instead the amendments
mandating a legislatively enacted retirement system, the provision for
mandatory retirement was omitted, though the record of debates does not
show this omission was intentional. 275 But later, a floor amendment
authored by Delegate Max Tobias was adopted to reinstate the mandatory
27 6
retirement provision proposed by the committee.
The mandatory retirement age of 70, however, applies only to judges
who were not in office on the effective date of the constitution. As to those
judges, Section 23(A) provides that their "judicial service rights" "shall
not be diminished, . .. " Though the term "judicial service rights" is not
a term of art, Delegate Tobias indicated to the convention:
Now this particular phrase would not affect any presently sitting
judge. The reason is that under the Kean amendment, the phrase
'judicial service rights' would continue any judge in office until the
277
age seventy-five, at least.
Since the reference to age 75 is to the prior constitution's mandatory
retirement age, it appears clear that the purpose was to keep that retirement
278
age with respect to judges who served under the prior constitution.
Tobias also explained that some judges could continue in office
"under some circumstances to age eighty. "279 The reference here is also
to the prior constitution which provided:
However, any judge now serving [December, 1960], who, attaining the age of seventy-five years, has served less than twenty
years, may remain in service until he has served for twenty years or
until he has attained the age of eighty years whichever shall occur
280
first and shall then retire.
275. JOURNAL, Aug. 18, 1973 at 8; id.,
Aug. 22, 1973 at 2.
276. Id., Aug. 22, 1973 at 3.
277. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 22, 1973 at 20.
278. MINUTES, Aug. 8 (9 a.m.), 1973 at 3.
279. Id.at 21.

280. La. Const. art. VII, § 8 (1921). The reference to November 8, 1960 is to the
effective date of the constitutional amendment which first introduced the phrase

"now serving" into the section. The reference would be to the time of adoption of
the amendment. See La. Acts 1960, No. 592 proposing the constitutional amendment adopted November 8, 1960. Under the 1921 Constitution, Article XXI, Sec-

tion 1, the amendment was effective twenty days after the governor's proclamation
of the election results.
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The effect of these provisions then is: (1) judges first taking office
after the effective date of the constitution must retire at age 70; (2) those in
office on the effective date must retire at 75, except for (3) those in office
in December 1960, who can continue to serve as necessary to accumulate
20 years of service, up to age 80.
Disciplineand Removal
A judge, as a "state or district official" is subject to impeachment
proceedings under Article X, Section 24,281 based on "commission or
conviction, during his term of office, of a felony or for malfeasance or
gross misconduct while in such office." The sanction is immediate removal from office, though by the terms of Section 24, other discipline authorized by law is not precluded.
The "judges of the courts of record" are excepted from removal by
suit under Article X, Section 25, or by recall elections under Article X,
Section 26. The alternate means for disciplining judges is provided in
the
Article V, Section 25, which continues a system of discipline by 282
supreme court acting on recommendation of a judiciary commission.
By the language of Article V, Section 25, the supreme court cannot
act on its own initiative to discipline a judge, but must respond to
recommendations of the commission. The court, of course, is not bound to
accept the commission's recommendations; the reference is that the court
may impose discipline. Since the reference is to disciplining "a judge,"
without that term being qualified, the disciplinary procedure extends to all
judges. This would include judges of the supreme court, since the ter281. Although Article X, Section 24 does not continue language of the prior
constitution that disqualified a judge, district attorney or attorney general convicted

upon impeachment from practicing law, the debate evidenced no intent to exclude
those officials from the impeachment provisions. PROCEEDINGS, July 28, 1973 at 41,
45-46. In fact, the immediately following provisions, Sections 25 and 26, dealing
with removal by suit and with recall elections, make specific exceptions for judges
whereas Section 24 does not. Furthermore, the reference in Section 24 to any state
or district official being subject to impeachment certainly includes judges of the
district courts, courts of appeal and of the supreme court, as well as a district
attorney or the attorney general. Id. at 74-82.
During the debate on the impeachment article, the spokesman for the committee said explicitly that the proposal as written applied to judges. Id. at 45-46. Later
in the convention when the judiciary article was under consideration, the chairman
of that committee stated that judges were subject to impeachment. Id., Apr. 15,
1973 at 52.
282. La. Const. art. IX, § 4 (1921).
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minology of the judiciary article is to use the term "judge" all-inclusively
283
and not to make a technical distinction between judges and justices.
Continued as grounds for discipline are "willful misconduct relating
to his official duty" and "persistent failure to perform his duty." The
prior ground, "conviction, while in office, of a felony" is expanded to
encompass "conduct while in office which would constitute a felony"
even if a judge is not actually tried and convicted, as well as "conviction
of a felony" regardless of the time the conviction or the conduct occurred.
The more stringent standards of conduct the convention adopted are also
reflected in the new ground for discipline based on less serious infractions:
"persistent and public conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice
that brings the judicial office into disrepute." "Habitual intemperance" as
a ground for discipline was deleted, but it was agreed in committee that
such intemperance would be included in the new provision if the intemperance is persistent and public, prejudicial to the administration of justice,
and brings the judicial office into disrepute .284
Section 25 is more flexible than the predecessor provision in that it
expands the range of disciplinary sanctions. It continues the prior sanctions of removal from office and involuntary retirement, but also adds
provisions for censure and suspension from performance of duties with or
without salary. Another innovation allows, "On recommendation of the
judiciary commission, the supreme court may disqualify a judge from
exercising any judicial function, without loss of salary, during the pendency of proceedings in the supreme court."
Also new in the section is provision for situations in which a judge,
though committing no acts of misconduct, suffers from some "disability
that seriously interferes with the performance of his duties and that is or is
likely to become permanent." In such a case, the judge may be retired
involuntarily by the court, again on recommendation of the commis285
sion.
These changes give the commission and the court broader powers and
more flexibility. The broader range of sanctions, particularly in allowing
less drastic ones, will allow action in less serious cases of misconduct than
before. Combined with the rule-making power and administrative control
283. Though Article V, Section 3 uses "justice" to continue prior formalities in
this regard, that same section in the next sentence refers to a "supreme court
judge" and the following sections use the term "judge" in speaking of members of
the supreme court. See LA. CONsT. art. V, §§ 6, 21-24.
284. Baton Rouge State Times, May 26, 1973, at I-B, col. 5.
285. See In re Judge Alexander, 323 So. 2d 448 (La. 1975).
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of the supreme court, this development will be an aid in more efficient
administration of the lower courts.
The convention accepted the committee proposal to enlarge the commission from seven to nine members and to restructure it to provide more
citizen and lawyer representation.28 6 Judges constituted four of the seven
members of the commission under the old composition, along with two
lawyers and one layman. In the new commission, judges account for three
28 7
of the nine members, along with three attorneys and three laymen.
While members of the legal profession still account for six of nine
members, the new membership does open the commission to more public
participation and ends the judges' majority on the panel.
An attempt was made, based largely on the ground that Section 25
was too long and detailed to be appropriate for a constitution, to provide
simply that a commission would be established with the legislature providing its structure. That attempt failed by a rather close 51-64 vote. 288 The
section, however, is much shorter than the prior provision. The reduction
was accomplished primarily by omitting procedural detail and providing
instead that the supreme court shall make such rules for the commission.
The rules must provide for confidentiality of commission proceedings, but
the confidentiality cannot extend to proceedings in the supreme court once
the commission has completed its investigation and made its recommendations. 289 And finally, Subsection D continues the prior law in providing
that action under Section 25 does not preclude other disciplinary action
286. See LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 28.
287. One judge must be appointed from the court of appeal and two from the
district bench; selection is by the supreme court. The lay representatives are
selected by the Louisiana District Judges' Association, and the attorneys by the
Conference of Court of Appeal Judges. By floor amendment it was provided that

two of the lawyers must have practiced at least ten years, instead of applying that
requirement to all three attorneys. The third attorney, by virtue of the amendment
sponsored by some of the younger convention delegates, must be a lawyer with 3-10
years' experience at the bar. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 22, 1973 at 54-55. See also id. at
48-51.
The convention defeated a floor amendment that would have provided for the
governor participating in the selection process, id. at 61-64, and a proposal for
appointment by the supreme court of members representing each congressional
district. Id. at 64-67.
288. Id. at 60.
289. An amendment to clarify that confidentiality could not extend to the court
proceedings was adopted. Id. at 54. The recent statute providing for confidentiality

of commission proceedings is unconstitutional since Article V, Section 25(C) grants
the power to the supreme court instead of to the legislature.
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concerning a judge's license to practice under the general bar association
disciplinary procedures.
OTHER COURT-RELATED OFFICIALS

Attorney Generaland DistrictAttorney
Article IV, Section 8, establishes the Department of Justice and
continues provisions for an attorney general elected statewide for a fouryear term. 29 Little dispute arose over the provision making him "the chief
legal officer of the state" and continuing his powers in civil matters, but
much controversy was generated by proposals establishing his powers in
criminal matters, particularly his relationship with district attorneys.
Both the Committee on the Executive Branch and the Judiciary
Committee proposed sections to govern the attorney general, the Executive proposal granting him broader authority. 29 1 That proposal reached the
convention floor first, but the section governing the attorney general was
amended to delete all reference to his powers, leaving the matter open
until the Judiciary Committee proposal came before the convention. 292 It
was the Judiciary Committee's formula establishing the powers of the
office that became the basis for debate and that was ultimately adopted by
the convention. Later, after referral to the Committee on Style and Drafting, those provisions were transferred from the Judiciary Article to Article
IV on the Executive Branch.2 93
Underlying the struggle between the attorney general and the district
attorneys over the former's authority in criminal matters was the uncertainty of the jurisprudence construing those powers under the prior con290. See La. Const. art. VII, §§ 55-57 (1921).
291. The Executive proposal was Committee Proposal 4, § 8, in JOURNAL, July
6, 1973 at 12. The Judiciary proposals were Committee Proposal 6, §§ 28, 29, in
JOURNAL, July 6, 1973 at 17 and Committee Proposal 21, §§ 26, 27, in JOURNAL,
Aug. 22, 1973 at 9, and Aug. 23, 1973 at 6. MINUTES, Apr. 13, 1973 at 3: "Mr. Edwin
0. Ware, District Attorney, wrote Judge Dennis, a letter stating that at the annual
convention of the Louisiana District Attorneys' Association held in New Orleans in
March, the district attorneys and assistants voted unanimously in favor of the
Judiciary Committee writing the articles dealing with district attorneys."
292. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 8, 1973 at 46-50. Delegate Camille Gravel explaining his
amendment: "[A]lI that this does is to create the department and to constitutionally
declare that the attorney general shall be head of that department and the state's
chief legal officer. All of the matters relating to the functions, powers and duties of
the department and of the office of attorney general will be relegated to future
consideration when we consider the judiciary article." Id. at 47.
293. Id., Jan. 15, 1974 at 86-89.
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stitution, particularly the power "to institute and prosecute or to intervene
in any and all suits or other proceedings, civil or criminal. . . ." and to
exercise "supervision over the several district attorneys throughout the
State ..... 294 Kemp v. Stanley295 did prevent an attorney general from
"superseding" or ousting the district attorney in a criminal case, but did
so in a mass of complex original and rehearing opinions with several
concurrences and dissents that established no clear construction of the
constitutional provision and provided no clear guide as to the relationship
between the attorney general and the district attorney. That case, and the
varying constructions of it, became the background of discussion of the

attorney general's power to supervise the district attorneys, to supersede
them in pending cases, and to institute criminal proceedings on his own

authority.
The Executive proposal allowed the attorney general to institute or
intervene in criminal proceedings on his own initiative, to supervise the
district attorneys and to supersede a district attorney for cause.2 96 The
Judiciary proposal was unclear as to the power to institute prosecutions,
omitted the power to supervise the district attorneys and allowed the
attorney general to supersede a district attorney only for cause when
authorized by a court. 297 Convention debate on these proposals was preceded by the unusual procedure of allowing the attorney general and the
president of the district attorneys association to address the group. 298 Their
presentations were devoted in large part to the impact of Kemp v. Stanley.
294. La. Const. art. VII, § 56 (1921).
295. 204 La. 110, 15 So. 2d 1 (1943).
296. Committee Proposal 4,§ 8,inJOURNAL, July 6, 1973 at 12. The relevant
language was: "As may be necessary for the assertion or protection of the rights
and interests of the state, the attorney general shall have authority to: (1) institute,
and prosecute or intervene in any legal actions or other proceedings, civil or
criminal; (2) exercise supervision over the several district attorneys throughout the
state; and (3) for cause, supersede any attorney representing the state in any civil or
criminal proceeding."
297. Committee Proposal 21, § 27, in JOURNAL, Aug. 23, 1973 at 6; Committee
Proposal 6, § 29, in JOURNAL, July 6, 1973 at 17. The latter provided in part: "As
may be necessary for the assertion or protection of the rights and interests of the
state, the attorney general shall have authority to: (1) institute and prosecute or
intervene in any civil actions or proceedings; (2) advise and assist, upon request of a
district attorney, in the prosecution of a criminal case; and (3) for cause when
authorized by the court of original jurisdiction in which any proceeding is pending,
subject to judicial review, supersede any attorney representing the state in any civil
or criminal action."
298.

PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 22, 1973 at 77-88.
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As the convention began to debate the proposals, it first defeated an
amendment that had the effect of making no constitutional grant of power
to the attorney general and allowing the legislature to regulate his powers.2 99 Also defeated was an amendment proposed by delegates who
served on the Committee on the Executive Branch that would have
substituted their committee's proposal on the attorney general for that of
the Judiciary Committee." ° It was defeated by a vote of 24-97, the
delegates apparently agreeing with Delegate I. Jackson Burson, who in
opposition to the amendment stated:
Now most of the remarks that I have heard in advancing the
power of the attorney general to supersede local district attorneys
seem to assume that a statewide elected official will be inherently
more virtuous than a locally elected official. I challenge that assumption.3 0'
Debate continued on the details of the judiciary proposal. An attempt
was made to restrict the attorney general even more by deleting his power
to supersede a district attorney, even for cause. The amendment was
defeated, the convention opting for some control over local district attorneys, albeit subject to court review and not at the attorney general's
discretion.3 °2 As Delegate Walter G. Arnette stated:
I think if a district attorney is not doing his job, someone ought
to step in, someone ought to take care of the people of that district. If
there is organized crime in the area, if there is crime that is not being
prosecuted, someone ought to step in and have the power to prosecute
it.

30 3

Also defeated was another attempt to grant the attorney general power to
supervise the district attorneys. 3°' However, the constitution did adopt an
amendment sponsored by the chairman of the Judiciary Committee that
clarified the language of the proposal to make clear that the attorney
general could, for cause, institute a prosecution and not be limited to
simply intervening in prosecutions already commenced.3 5
Thus, in a battle between state power and local power, the convention
299. d. at 91, 92.
300. Id. at 93-100.
301. Id. at 96.
302.
303.
304.
305.

Id., Aug. 23, 1973 at 59-69.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 69-74.
Id. at 93, 94. See also PROCEEDINGS, Jan. 15, 1974 at 82-84.
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adopted a compromise. Some checks and balances remain between the
attorney general and the district attorneys, with the courts being required
to intervene when the two authorities come into conflict. And, in view of
some readings of Kemp v. Stanley as not allowing the attorney general to
supersede a district attorney without cause, some delegates thought they
were continuing the existing state of the law. In any event, Article IV,
Section 9 makes the attorney general "the chief legal officer of the state"
and then more particularly enumerates that "[a]s necessary for the assertion or protection of any right or interest of the state, the attorney general
shall have authority
(1) to institute, prosecute, or intervene in any civil action or
proceeding;
(2) upon the written request of a district attorney, to advise and
assist in the prosecution of any criminal case; and
(3) for cause, when authorized by the court which would have
original jurisdiction and subject to judicial review, (a) to institute,
prosecute, or intervene in any criminal action or proceeding, or (b) to
supersede any attorney representing the state in any civil or criminal
action.
It also provides that the attorney general "shall exercise other powers and
perform other duties authorized by this constitution or by law."
The provision that the attorney general shall be the chief legal officer
of the state is new. It comes from the Executive proposal, but neither the
committee comments nor the convention debate provide a history of the
implications of that language. 3°6 Referring to him as the "chief" legal
officer certainly implies control over other legal officers and would seem
to give him that control. But to the extent that this general power conflicts
with the more specific enumeration of powers in the next paragraph, the
general would have to give way to the specific. In areas where no conflict
exists, however, the language seems to mean that he does have control
over other legal officers of the state.
306. The provision comes from Committee Proposal 4, § 8, in JOURNAL, July 6,
1973 at 12, by the Executive Department committee. The committee comments
simply said, "The attorney general is made the state's 'chief legal officer' without
further explanation." Id. The initial Judiciary Committee Proposal did not use the
chief legal officer description, but rather paraphrased language from the 1921
Constitution. Committee Proposal 6, §§ 28, 29, in JOURNAL, July 6, 1973 at 17. The
Judiciary's later proposal, a substitute for the first, Committee Proposal21, § 27, in
JOURNAL, Aug. 23, 1973 at 6, used the chief legal officer formula of the Executive

proposal without explanation.
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Subsection (1) in referring to his power to institute, prosecute or
intervene in any civil action or proceeding is a continuation of prior
provisions and is unlimited.3" 7 Subsection (2), which raised little controversy, refers to his authority to "advise and assist in the prosecution of
any criminal case" when requested by a district attorney. By its terms, the
provision requires that the request be in writing.
It is Subsection (3) that establishes the attorney general's power to act
on his own authority in criminal matters. If the requirements of "cause"
are met, he can "institute, prosecute, or intervene in any criminal action
or proceeding." The, power to institute refers not only to filing bills of
information, but also to presenting evidence to a grand jury in cases where
a grand jury indictment is desirable or necessary. This is so because the
reference is not only to instituting an "action" in the sense of a court
proceeding, but also to instituting a "proceeding" before a grand jury.
Under this grant, he can prosecute a case himself, without reference to a
district attorney, or he can intervene and not act as sole prosecutor. If the
cause requirement is met, he can also supersede a district attorney in any
criminal action which has already been commenced. This subsection also
recognizes his power to supersede any attorney representing the state in
any civil action, again if the cause requirement is met.30 8
The central problem then becomes defining the "cause" which a
court must find before it authorizes the attorney general to take the
measures described above. The authorization must come from the court
"which would have original jurisdiction" over the underlying criminal
conduct or action about which or in which the attorney general wishes to
exercise his authority, and is subject to review by the appellate courts.
The cause requirement is related to the introductory phrase of the
paragraph, "[a]s necessary for the assertion or protection of any right or
interest of the state," indicating that the "cause" must be associated with
the fact that a right or interest of the state is not being satisfactorily
represented or asserted by a district attorney. The record of the debate is
replete with statements that the power of the attorney general is the power
to act when a local district attorney is not fulfilling his duties satisfactorily,
307. La. Const. art. VII, § 56 (1921). See Ricks v. Department of State Civil
Serv., 200 La. 341, 8 So. 2d 49 (1942); Saint v. Allen, 172 La. 350, 134 So. 246

(1931).
308. In recognizing the power to supersede, the new constitution incorporates
language which the prior constitution did not contain. But Kemp v. Stanley, 204 La.
110, 15 So. 2d 1 (1943), indicates that the power to supersede for cause did exist
under the prior provision.

836
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3
as when he is not prosecuting cases that ought to be prosecuted. 1
Reference was made to citizens filing complaints with a district attorney
and failing to obtain action; in such a case, the implication was that the
attorney general could act. It was pointed out that use of the malfeasance
laws was not a practical means of proceeding against a district attorney if it
were that district attorney alone who could bring such a prosecution; the
attorney general would be the only check on him in such a case.
The cause requirement can also be traced to Kemp v. Stanley, in
which statements were made in the original opinion and in concurring
opinions on rehearing that while the attorney general could not have total
discretion in superseding a district attorney, he could supersede if his
actions were not capricious and arbitrary, but had some basis supporting
his action. There, the court pointed out the district attorney had not been
neglectful of his duty in any way, so there was no cause for the attorney
general to intervene. The implication is that had there been neglect, the
attorney general action would have been permissible.31 0 In some matters
involving statewide organized criminal activity, cause may exist because
the resources and powers of district attorneys, who are limited largely to
acting with respect to offenses occurring in their judicial districts, may be
unsatisfactory to investigate and prosecute the large scale criminal activi-

ty. 311

That the cause requirement is not an insurmountable one is shown by
convention rejection of an amendment to require a stronger standard,
"proven cause," before the attorney general could act. The sponsor
indicated he did not want "alleged cause" to be sufficient, but the
convention rejected the amendment by a vote of 55-60 and chose the lesser
standard. 312 It also rejected an amendment to require that in multi-member
309. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 23, 1973 at 58, 66, 77. Chairman Dennis stated: "I think
the committee intended all along to make certain that where there was an abuse and
the district attorney was not doing his job, that the attorney general could go into
court and ask for a court order and initiate a prosecution." Id. at 77. Delegate Chris
Roy indicated that "if a person committed a crime, no question about it and a D.A.

for one reason or another did not see fit to bring a bill of information against him or
present it to the grand jury" that was grounds for the attorney general acting. Id.
310. See id. at 58. Delegate Burns stated, "Mr. Kilbourne, didn't the Supreme
Court hold in the Kemp case that the attorney general could not go into a district
without it (sic) showing legal cause?" See also id. at 66.
311. Delegate Arnette spoke of keeping a mechanism for state action and not
relegating state law enforcement to federal agencies: "Are you going to have the
federal government coming in and prosecuting those people under some federal
law, and I don't think that is the way, it ought to be." (sic) Id. at 66.
312. Id. at 88-93.
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district courts, a majority of the judges must concur to authorize attorney
general intervention; the district court acting normally through a single
judge can authorize the action.313
Though the section does not address itself directly to the investigatory
powers of the attorney general, it implies the existence of those powers.
The attorney general must be able to amass the factual showing necessary
for establishing cause to act and must be able to investigate criminal
matters to establish those facts. The section also fails to specify the
procedure to be followed when requests for authorization are made; it
would then be left to the legislature to establish that procedure and
provide, for example, when such authorization can be ex parte and when
contradictory hearings with a district attorney are required. In terms of
procedure, one could easily raise many problems associated with having a
"mini-trial" between the attorney general and a district attorney revolving
around the conduct of a future defendant before the same judge who might
have to sit at the ultimate trial of the defendant. In fact, one could raise
many other problems with the whole concept. But, this accommodation
between the state interests and the local interest was a hard-fought political
compromise reflecting political realities, and it is in effect.
Though Section 8 in the last paragraph allows the legislature to grant
the attorney general additional powers and duties beyond those enumerated, such legislation cannot alter the constitution's basic ordering of the
relationship between the district attorneys and the attorney general. This is
because of the provisions of Article V, Section 26: "Except as otherwise
provided by this constitution, a district attorney shall have charge of every
criminal prosecution by the state in his district, be the representative of the
state before the grand jury in his district, and be the legal advisor to the
grand jury." The exception clause refers to the constitution's recognition
of the powers of the attorney general provided in Article IV, Section 8,
and does not include provisions otherwise that are established by law.
Thus, while the legislature can provide for additional powers and duties of
the attorney general, such legislation cannot alter the district attorney's
powers as stated in Section 26. Of course, additional powers with respect
to district attorneys can be granted to the attorney general, so long as the
former's constitutional enumeration of powers is not abridged.
The district attorney remains a constitutional officer, with one elected
in each judicial district for a term of six years. 314 The qualifications for the
313. Id.
314.

LA. CONST. art. V, § 26. See La. Const. art. VII, §§ 58-64 (1921).
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office parallel those of judges-admitted to the practice of law for five
years preceding election and residence in the district for two years. 315 The
experience requirement is changed to five years from the prior constitution's three-year requirement; however, the new document deletes althe district attorney have
together the prior requirement that assistants to
316
three years experience in the practice of law.
Section 26(C) does provide that no district attorney or assistant "shall
appear, plead, or in any way defend or assist in defending any criminal
prosecution or charge. A violation of this Paragraph shall be cause for
removal." ' 317 However, the constitution does not prevent a district attorney from practicing law and handling civil matters. An amendment to
prohibit all law practice by district attorneys failed, though the debate
makes it clear that the legislature can in the future impose that restriction.318
As proposed by the committee, the section did not specify the powers
and duties of the district attorney, just as the prior constitution had not.
Though the convention did not act to add a statement of powers and duties
when it considered the section on the district attorney, it did adopt one by a
rider to the section regulating grand juries. 319 That statement of powers
was later added to Section 26 on recommendation of the Committee on
Style and Drafting.
The statement of powers and duties in Section 26(B) tracks the
language of the Code of Criminal Procedure; his power to "have charge of
every criminal prosecution by the state in his district" comes from article
61, and the statement that he "be the representative of the state before the
grand jury in his district and be the legal advisor to the grand jury" comes
from article 64. The exception clause was included "to make it possible
for the attorney general, when he supersedes a district attorney, to have
charge of criminal prosecutions. "320
As originally adopted, the provision gave the district attorney charge
of "every criminal prosecution in his district." An amendment was
adopted to have the phrase read instead "prosecution by the state in his
315. See LA. CONST. art. V, §§ 24, 26.
316. See La. Const. art. VII, § 61 (1921). An amendment that sought to require
three years of experience for assistants was defeated. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 23, 1973
at 104-07.
317. See La. Const. art. VII, § 63 (1921).
318. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 23, 1973 at 109-23.
319. Id., Aug. 24, 1973 at 124-33.
320. Id. at 126.
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district" to make clear he would not have charge of prosecutions by
municipalities and other subdivisions of the state. 32 ' The author stated:
". .. we are referring in the district attorneys' powers only to state
prosecutions and not to municipal or city prosecutions for violation of city
ordinances.' '322 Thus, the district attorney must have control of all prosecutions for violation of state law within his district, but he does not have
that control with respect to prosecutions for violations of city ordinances.
Of course, the provision does not require that the district attorney prosecute all cases involving state law. Other persons, including city prosecutors, can be allowed to do so, so long as the district attorney retains
control of the course of the prosecution.
Sheriffs
As officials elected to serve in a parish, sheriffs might well have been
within the province of the Committee on Local and Parochial Government. Such an arrangement would have been appropriate since only a
small part of a sheriff's duties are court-related. However, since the 1921
Constitution included sheriffs in Article VII on the judiciary, and the
Judiciary Committee was alloted jurisdiction of all of Article VII by the
convention rules, provisions relating to sheriffs were drafted by that
committee. Consideration by the Judiciary Committee was not opposed
partly because the politically powerful sheriffs had two of their number
represented on that committee,323 and because the Committee on Local
Government apparently made no objection.
Section 27, which provides for one sheriff in each parish and states
his duties, does not by its terms apply to Orleans Parish. There, the
existing civil and criminal sheriffs (without law enforcement and tax
collecting duties) are continued by Section 32. The Judiciary Committee
proposal, though it did not include a clause excepting Orleans from
Section 27, did allow different treatment of Orleans sheriffs by a separate
section on Orleans officials. 324 However, by the time the convention
considered the provisions on the sheriffs, there was some doubt as to
whether the later section preserving some Orleans differences would be
321. Id. at 136.
322. Id.
323. Sheriff Gordon J. Martin and Sheriff Jessel M. Ourso. MINUTES, Mar. 30,
1973 at 3, state that the committee voted without objection to consider all officers in
the judiciary article "including sheriffs" as provided by the convention rules of
procedure.
324. Committee Proposal 21, § 35, in JOURNAL, Aug. 24, 1973 at 7; Committee
Proposal 6, § 37, in JOURNAL, July 6, 1973 at 17.
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adopted. This uncertainty prompted several Orleans delegates to sponsor
an amendment to the proposal on sheriffs to add the last sentence which
provides that Section 27 shall not apply to Orleans Parish, and the
amendment was adopted. 325 Later, Section 32, which continues the separate criminal and civil sheriffs in Orleans, was also adopted, the section
specifying that the offices may be changed by law.326 The result is that
sheriffs in all parishes but Orleans are given strong constitutional protection and constitutional duties, but the Orleans sheriffs are subject to
regulation and change by the legislature.
The provisions of Sections 27 and 32 apply even if a home rule
charter or plan of government should provide otherwise. Though Article
VI, Section 4 continues existing charters and plans of government, that
provision specifically indicates that this is so "except as inconsistent with
this constitution." It would be inconsistent with the constitution for such
local charters to provide other than as Sections 27 and 32 provide. This
conclusion is consistent with the fact that sheriffs are covered in the
Judiciary Article rather than in the Local Government Articles, and is
further buttressed by the convention's defeat of an amendment to Section
27 which would have provided that the section does not apply "to any
parish in which there may be a provision in a parish home rule charter or
327
plan of government to the contrary."
Section 27 specifies three duties for the sheriff: (1)he executes court
orders and process; (2) he is the collector of state and parish ad valorem
taxes and such other taxes and licenses as provided by law; and (3) he is
the chief law enforcement officer in the parish, except as otherwise
provided by the constitution.
The new language making the sheriff responsible for enforcement of
court orders and process 328 was proposed by the committee and raised little
controversy. As adopted, the unqualified provision makes the sheriff's
obligation extend to executing the orders and process of any court. This
325. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 24, 1973 at 19, 20. The Orleans delegates were joined in
sponsoring the resolution by Sheriffs Edwards, Martin and Ourso, and the amendment was adopted by a vote of 104-15. Id. at 30.
326. The committee proposal made change more difficult, but it was amended to
allow change by law. Id. at 80-97.
327. Id. at 31-28. See also id. at 23, 25.
328. The 1921 Constitution did not so provide; however, Article VII, Section 28
of the 1921 Constitution did contain a provision that in the First and Second Circuit
Courts of Appeal, the sheriff of the parish in which a session of those courts was
held was required to attend sessions and execute orders of the court. See LA. R.S.
13:353(B) (Supp. 1975).

1977]

1

THE JUDICIAL ARTICLE

relationship to the district courts and the appellate courts is clear. 329

However, the sheriff's role in executing orders of courts below the district
court level is less clear. Article V, Section 15 provides, "The office of

city marshal is continued until the city court he serves is abolished.'"'33
Continuing the marshal, who serves to enforce orders and process of city
courts, contemplates no doubt his having duties somewhat similar to those

under existing law, including serving process and executing orders. When
a city court is abolished, presumably in accord with the creation of a parish
court as per Section 15, the implication is that the office of marshal would
be abolished and then Section 27 can be given full effect so that the sheriff
will be the executing agent of the newly created parish court.
The 1921 Constitution provided the sheriff with power to collect
"[sltate, parish and all other taxes, except municipal taxes, which, however, under legislative authority, he may also collect."331 That provision
was construed narrowly by the court in Interstate Tax Bureau v. Conway,332 and in accord with that jurisprudence, the committee and the
convention voted to refer to "state and parish ad valorem taxes and such
other taxes and license fees as provided by law." Thus, though the
legislature may provide for sheriffs collecting other taxes, the right of the
sheriff is with respect to collecting state and parish ad valorem taxes, that
is, taxes on property based on the value of the property. 333 The fees a
sheriff receives for such collection services are not constitutionalized and
will continue to be provided for by the statute.
The provision that the sheriff "shall be the chief law enforcement
officer in the parish, except as otherwise provided by this constitution" is
new. The contours of this power are vague, but neither in the committee
debates nor in the convention transcript does one find expressed the view
that the sheriff will be the exclusive law enforcement agent. During its
329. Considering the background of statutory law existing at the time of the
convention which provides for the sheriff as the executive officer of the district
courts and the appellate courts, it seems clear that his association with those courts
was clearly contemplated. See LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 321; LA. R.S. 33:1435 (1950).
330. An attempt to delete the reference to city marshals in the constitution by
floor amendment was defeated. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 17, 1973 at 29.
331. La. Const. art. VII, § 65 (1921).
332. 180 La. 453, 458, 156 So. 463, 464 (1934). The court said, "The plain intent
of those constitutional provisions is to charge the officials therein referred to with
the duty of collecting state, parish, levee, drainage and other taxes assessed on
property situated within their respective territorial jurisdictions." (Emphasis added).
333. The section was adopted without opposition from the sheriffs; it was

approved by a vote of 120-1.

PROCEEDINGS,

Aug. 24, 1973 at 4. See also id. at 18.
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deliberations, the committee had before it the existing statutory provisions
dealing with activities of the state police in municipalities, 334 and there
was no apparent sentiment to further restrict the state police, or to abolish
municipal law enforcement agencies. In presenting the section to the
convention, the chairman of the committee spoke rather in terms of having
the sheriff as the coordinating agency in case of operations involving
several law enforcement agencies. He spoke in terms of the sheriff being
the one to "coordinate efforts of law enforcement agencies in the event of
a major catastrophe or a major event requiring all the law enforcement
agencies to come in." ' 335 Also, in answer to a question about the sheriff
superseding city police, he said:
This does not attempt to spell it out in detail but simply establishes a policy that the sheriff will be the chief law enforcement
officer and leaves up to the legislature, if it should have to do so, and
we haven't had to do it in fifty years, if it should have to do so, to
spell out in detail the procedures for law enforcement agencies in a
336
parish.
Later, committee member James T. Burns and Chairman Dennis engaged
in this colloquy:
Mr. 6urns: "Judge, just to bring it out a little more clearly. Did we
not discuss at length with reference to the sheriff being the chief law
enforcement officer, that we definitely did not intend to keep out the
state police or interfere with the city police chiefs or city police, but
merely to, as you stated just now, that this would be a coordinating
agency and not by any means diminish or interfere with the authority
of the state police or the city police?"
337
Mr. Dennis: "That's correct, Mr. Burns. Thank you very much."
Though the exception clause in Section 27 is not clear, it can refer to
several provisions dealing with various aspects of law enforcement. Section 26 empowers the district attorney with charge of every criminal
prosecution in his district; Article V, Section 8 recognizes implied criminal investigatory powers in the attorney general; Article I,Section 15 and
Article V, Section 34, appear to recognize the existence of investigatory
powers in the grand jury; Article X, Section 16 establishing civil service
334. Committee on the Judiciary, Staff Memo 19 (unpublished). See LA. R.S.
40:1386-88 (1950).
335. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 24, 1973 at 18.
336. Id. at 17.
337. Id. at 19.
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systems for municipal police departments implies the continued existence
of those departments; Article X, Section 10 allowing the legislature to
supplement the pay of state policemen and wildlife agents seems to
recognize the continued existence of those law enforcement agencies; and
Article VI, Section 9(B) provides that the police power of the state shall
never be abridged.
In light of these provisions, and of the explanation of the chairman of
the judiciary committee, it would seem that the new provision should be
considered a generalized recognition of a sheriff's ultimate coordination
powers rather than a recognition of exclusive powers in him, and a
recognition of substantial legislative power to order the types of coordination that would be involved.
Clerks of Court
The clerk of the district court is continued as a constitutional officer;
Section 28 requires that a clerk be elected in each parish and that he
function as recorder of conveyances, mortgages and other acts. However,
Article 32 makes clear that the current situation in New Orleans, with
separate clerks for the civil and criminal courts and a separate register of
conveyances and recorder of mortgages, will continue to exist until
changed by law.
A small change is made in that while the prior constitution required
approval of the district judges before a clerk could appoint all his deputies,
the new provision requires that approval only with respect to minute
itself rather than those handling
clerks, those deputies who serve the court
33 8
the other functions of the clerk's office.
The committee proposed the new provision that mandates the legislature to establish uniform statewide office hours for clerks of the district
court in response to lawyer complaints about lack of uniformity and
uncertainty as to when offices are open to receive documents which must
be filed within specified delays. The Clerk of Court Association endorsed
this provision, and the convention rejected an amendment to delete the
requirement. 33 9
The constitutional duties of the clerk repeat the prior law, and it is
3
clear that the legislature may provide other duties. 4
338. Id. at 39. See La. Const. art. VII, § 67 (1921).
339. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 24, 1973 at 41-46.
340. See La. Const. art. VII, § 66 (1921).
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Coroner

The coroner remains a constitutional officer to be elected in each
parish for a four-year term. However, the constitution no longer states
duties for the office; the duties of the coroner are simply those "provided
by law." Deleted from the new constitution are the provisions of the 1921
Constitution which provided the coroner "shall be ex-officio parish physician" and "shall act for and in place of the sheriff, whenever the sheriff
shall be a party interested, and whenever there shall be a vacancy in the
office of sheriff ..

."I" These provisions were deleted as part of the

committee proposal, 34 2 the committee recommending that the chief criminal deputy assume the powers of the sheriff in case of a vacancy. To allow
the legislature more flexibility in providing for expert determination of
forensic medicine problems that could arise in relation to court operations,
the committee also proposed to delete the requirement that the coroner be a
licensed physician:
The reason we have made these changes is, in some of our parishes
we have been unable to get physicians to perform the functions of
coroners and have had to rely upon other persons. For example, in
my parish our 3coroner is a psychologist. We could not get an M.D. to
34
take the job.

The convention, however, at the urging of physician-delegate Dr. Gerald
Weiss, reinstated the provision of the 1921 document that the coroner
must be a licensed physician, continuing also the exception that the
requirement is inapplicable "in any parish in which no licensed physicians
will accept the office." 3" By the terms of the section, also, the legislature
can enact additional qualifications in addition to the licensed physician
requirement.
Vacancies; Protection
The governor's power to fill vacancies in the office of sheriff, district
attorney, clerk and coroner is ended. 345 Section 20 provides that until the
341. Id. art. VII, §§ 70, 71 (1921).
342. Committee Proposal 21, § 32, in JOURNAL, Aug. 24, 1973 at 5; Committee
Proposal6, § 24, in JOURNAL, July 6, 1973 at 16.
343. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 24, 1973 at 49.
344. Id. at 58-63.
345. La. Const. art. VII, §§ 69, 72, 93 (1921). Under Sections 69 and 71, in the
case of a vacancy in the office of sheriff, the coroner assumed the duties until the
office was filled by gubernatorial appointment or election, depending on the remaining time in the term.
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vacancies are filled by election as provided by law, the duties of those
offices shall be assumed by the chief assistant concerned. 346 If there is no
chief assistant, or if he does not accept the office, the governing authority
or authorities of the parish or parishes concerned shall fill the vacancy by
appointment.
The clerk, coroner and sheriff being elected for a parish, the reference to local governing "authorities" is inapplicable as to them; the one
governing authority would then act. Since most district attorneys serve
multi-parish districts, however, if a vacancy occurs and there is no chief
assistant to assume the office, the governing authorities of the parishes
involved would fill the vacancy. The procedure for the governing authorities acting in such a case would be provided by law.
The language of Section 30 makes it clear that in case of vacancy, the
office is not "filled" or the term completed by the first assistant. "The
duties of the office" are fulfilled by the assistant until the remainder of the
term "is filled by election as provided by law ....
" There is no right in
the assistant to complete the term. In fact, by the language used, the
assistant doesn't even take over the office that is vacant; he merely
assumes "the duties when the vacancy occurs."
This parallels Section 22's regulation of vacancies in judgeships; it is
only after election that "a vacancy in the office of a judge shall be filled."
Until then, the court appoints a person to serve. The major difference
between the two schemes for filling vacancies is that with respect to
judges, the governor must call a special election within six months,
whereas with respect to the other officials, the election to fill the vacancy
is subject to regulation by law.
As Section 21 does for judges, Section 31 protects "the attorney
general, district attorney, sheriff, coroner or clerk" from having his salary
347
and retirement benefits diminished during his term of office.
JURORS AND JURIES

The constitution deletes the previous requirement that "no woman
shall be drawn for jury service unless she shall have previously filed with
the clerk of the District Court a written declaration of her desire to be
subject to such service.'"348 The committee had proposed this deletion,
346. The convention defeated an amendment that would have provided, in all
vacancies in the office of sheriff, clerk or coroner, for the local governing authority
selecting a person to fill the vacancy. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 24, 1973 at 66-73.
347. See the discussion at note 271, supra.
348. La. Const. art. VH , § 41 (1921).
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and the convention defeated, by a vote of 10-102, an attempt to continue

3 9
the requirement. 1

Section 33 establishes the minimum qualifications for jury servicestate citizenship, age of majority, domicile in the parish in which one is to
serve as a juror 3 5 -but by its terms also allows the legislature to enact
additional qualifications. Though the legislature has already acted to
remove the statutory registration requirements for women, 351 it is arguable
that the legislature could re-impose that requirement. However, the tenor
of the debate clearly indicates that women were to be called for jury duty
just as men, 352 furnishing strong authority for concluding that such a
discrimination would be unreasonable under the constitution's new equal
protection clause of Article I, Section 3. Of course, the United States
Supreme Court has also ruled that such a registration requirement for
353
women is unconstitutional.
The Judiciary Committee had proposed that the supreme court would
provide for "qualifications and exemption of jurors." 35 4 The convention
did not accept the grant of power to the court to establish qualifications;
instead it established the minimum requirements in the constitution and
provided that the legislature could enact additional qualifications. 35 However, the convention did concur in removing from the legislature and
placing in the supreme court the power to provide for exemptions from
jury service. Delegate Ambroise H. Landry, a member of the committee
and a clerk of court experienced with jury selection, was effective in
356
pointing out to the convention that the existing legislative exemptions
excluded from jury service large numbers of the best qualified people. As
he said, "When we omit all of these people, ladies and gentlemen, what
(sic) do we have left to serve on the jury?" ' 357 It was thought that the
supreme court would be less sensitive to interest group pressure for
exemptions, and that it would pare the existing encrustation of exemptions
3 58
and provide for fewer of them. The court has done so.
PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 24, 1973 at 98, 101, 105-09.
350. By referring to the age of majority rather than a specified age in years, the
constitution allows this requirement to change if the legislature changes the age of
majority.
351. La. Acts 1974, No. 20, § I (Ex. Sess.).
352. See PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 24, 1973 at 98-109.
353. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
354. Committee Proposal 21, § 36, in JOURNAL, Aug. 23, 1973 at 9.

349.

355.

PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 24, 1973 at 101-04.

356. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 403.
357.

PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 24, 1973 at 102.

358. LA. SUp. CT. R. 25. By its terms, the rule has the effect of "superseding
LSA-R.S. 13:3042, as amended, R.S. 13:3056, as amended, and Articles 402 and 403
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The provisions governing qualifications and exemptions in Section 33
apply to grand juries as well as petit juries . 359 Although the Judiciary
Article does not contain provisions establishing the types of cases in which
petit jury trials are required and does not specify the number of jurors
needed to concur to reach a verdict, those matters are covered in the
Declaration of Rights, Article I, Section 17. 60
Section 34 on the grand jury does not continue the detail of the
predecessor provision regulating the number of jurors required, the
number required to indict, the term of the grand jury, and the times for
empanelment. 3 6 1 These matters are to be regulated by law. The section
also allows more than one grand jury to be impaneled and in operation at
the same time in a parish. While the constitution does not require more
than one grand jury, it does allow the legislature to so provide. 362 By its
terms, also, the provision does not prohibit state-wide grand juries.
Though Section 34 does not specify the cases in which indictment is
required, Article I, Section 15 requires that "no person shall be held to
of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, as amended." The exemptions are
personal and must be claimed by the individual; when the jury commissioners
removed persons who had not claimed their exemption, the jury was not properly
selected and a conviction by such a jury was overturned. State v. Procell, 332 So.
2d 814 (La. 1976).
359. This was clear in the committee proposal. Committee Proposal21, § 36, in
JOURNAL, Aug. 23, 1973 at 9, provided the supreme court by rule would provide for
qualification and exemption of jurors and Section 37, the section which covered the
grand jury, provided that grand jurors would have the qualifications of Section 36.
When the convention began to consider Section 37 (renumbered in the constitution
as Section 34), it had already removed the supreme court's power to establish
qualifications by rule in the preceding section. To do the same in Section 37,
Delegate Robert G. Pugh introduced an amendment to delete the reference to the
preceding section and insert instead that the grand jury's "qualification, duties and
responsibilities should be provided by law." In explaining his amendment, Delegate
Pugh stated that the minimum qualifications of the prior section would apply and
that his proposal would not alter the supreme court's power over exemptions from
service on the grand jury. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 24, 1973 at 115.
360. See Hargrave, supra note 120, at 55.
361. La. Const. art. VII, § 42 (1921).
362. Explaining the provisions to the convention, Delegate John L. Avant said,
"We are not setting up the machinery in this provision, we are simply providing a
mechanism whereby the legislature in those unusual cases, can provide for special
grand juries to consider special matters that, because of the public importance

involved should be considered, must be considered without disrupting the ordinary
functions of the grand jury." PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 24, 1973 at 112. The prior
constitution provided for only one grand jury at one time. La. Const. art. VII, § 42
(1921). See La. Acts. 1975, No. 569, adding LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 415.1-.2.
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answer for a capital crime or a crime punishable by life imprisonment
except on indictment by a grand jury."
In committee, Delegate John L. Avant sponsored provisions to
strengthen the requirements of grand jury secrecy. He was especially
concerned about news reports that grand juries were investigating named
individuals and that certain persons had been called to testify and feared a
tendency to presume guilt, or at least some connection with crime, from
such disclosures. An initial proposal he submitted would have prevented
newsmen from reporting the names of witnesses called before the grand
jury, but the committee did not accept the recommendation because of
infringement of freedom of the press.363 What did emerge from the
committee was a mandate to the legislature to provide for secrecy of grand
jury proceedings, including the identity of the witnesses appearing. 364 An
attempt to delete the mandate was defeated by the convention, 365 and
Section 34 does provide, "The secrecy of the proceedings, including the
identity of witnesses, shall be provided by law." The Code of Criminal
Procedure has such provisions, 36 but it is also clear that an attempt to
penalize the news media for publication of the names of witnesses called
would be a violation of provisions in both the federal and state constitutions.3 67 The legislature can, of course, regulate the conduct of public
officials and grand jury members, so as to prevent their disclosure of the
names of witnesses.
A far-reaching amendment to the section proposed by Delegate Elmer
R. Tapper was adopted by a vote of 89-10, an amendment providing that
"[a] person testifying at any stage in grand jury proceedings shall have the
right to the advice of counsel while testifying." 368 The amendment was
adopted on August 24, 1973, after a debate that occupies less than one
page of the convention transcript of proceedings. However, opposition to
the provision developed, particularly from district attorneys. 369 As the
363. See Baton Rouge State Times, June 4, 1973, at I-A, cot. 7; Baton Rouge
Morning Advocate, June 3, 1973, at I-A, col. 7.
364. Committee Proposal 21, § 37, in JOURNAL, Aug. 24, 1973 at 10.
365. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 24,1973 at 124.
366. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 434.
367. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. 1; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
368.

PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 24, 1973 at 134.

369. Delegate I. Jackson Burson told the convention, "So, I requested counsel
from every district attorney in this state, and thirty-two of the thirty-four said that
in their opinion this measure would do more harm than good." Also "that we will be
to all practical effect, eliminating its use for that good purpose, for that purpose
which helps the defendant and will be limiting its use only to those that we have
absolutely mandated in this constitution." Id., Jan. 11, 1974 at 68.

1977]

THE JUDICIAL ARTICLE

849

convention was coming to an end, on January 11, 1974, the self-enforcing
provision was deleted and replaced with the mild provisions of Section
34(B): "The legislature may establish by law terms and conditions under
which a witness may have the right to the advice of counsel while
testifying before a grand jury. "370
Speaking against the amendment, Delegate Ford Stinson said, "Any time one
group, especially the district attorneys, that they think (sic) are so smart and so
strong that they can come in here and say: If you don't change one thing, then we're
going to beat the constitution. Well I say they should have written the constitution
to start with instead of us laboring for one year." Id. at 71.
370. The lead author of the amendment was convention chairman E.L. Henry.
In response to the view that the language was unnecessary since the legislature
could so act without the authorization, Delegate Burson indicated that the language
should be retained to avoid the possibility that the secrecy requirements would
prevent counsel from being present during grand jury proceedings. Id. at 75.

